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I.   INTRODUCTION
 On and around April 27, 2007, multiple commercial and govern-
mental Web sites in the Republic of Estonia came under a series of 
attacks.1 Thousands of computers proceeded to bombard specific 
servers with requests that caused the servers to buckle under the 
load, rendering them unavailable to other Internet users.2 Over the 
span of a few weeks, most of the attacks lasted less than an hour, but 
                                                                                                                    
 *. J.D., Florida State University; B.S., University of Massachuetts-Amherst. Anne 
Craig-Peña, Alyssa Lathrop, and Matt Beville all contributed helpful comments on an ear-
lier draft of this Comment. Special thanks to Professors Faye Jones and Danielle Citron for 
their comments and research advice, as well as to friends and family for their encourage-
ment. The editorial staff of the Florida State University Law Review provided insightful 
commentary, which further clarified and developed the piece. Finally, thanks to Professor 
Ezra Rosser, whose impassioned testimonial has inspired a burgeoning love of brie. See 
Ezra Rosser, On Becoming “Professor”: A Semi-Serious Look in the Mirror, 36 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 215 (2009). 
 1. E.g., A Cyber-riot; Estonia and Russia, ECONOMIST, May 12, 2007, at 55; Mark 
Landler & John Markoff, After Computer Siege in Estonia, War Fears Turn to Cyberspace,
N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2007, at A1.  
2. See Landler & Markoff, supra note 1, at A1. 
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a few concerted efforts lasted for ten hours or more.3 Investigations 
in the wake of the attacks indicated that they were not organized but 
appeared to be independent actions of similarly motivated but dis-
tinct individuals or groups.4 Early accusations were leveled first at 
the Russian government, but due to both the seemingly uncoordi-
nated nature of the attacks and the prevalence of the script used to 
attack the sites, the attack appeared to be nongovernmental in nature.5
 Popular culture has been rife with scenarios of a large-scale cybe-
rattack, which cripples infrastructure or causes significant disrup-
tions to daily life.6 The Estonian incident evoked similar worries, 
with terms such as “cyberwar” initially common, though ultimately 
misapplied.7 Such concerns have driven the national defense policy of 
the United States for years, but the massive scope of the Internet of-
fers glimpses of still-gaping security holes.8 The motivations behind 
such attacks can vary wildly. It appears that Russian nationalism 
stirred by the Estonian government’s decision to move a Russian 
World War II memorial motivated the attacks.9 Reports have sug-
gested that attacks originating in countries such as China may be 
state-sponsored in some way, though the issues have not yet raised a 
serious diplomatic concern.10 Given the absence of news regarding 
                                                                                                                    
 3. See Jose Nazario, Estonian DDoS Attacks – A Summary to Date (May 17, 2007), 
http://asert.arbornetworks.com/2007/05/estonian-ddos-attacks-a-summary-to-date (analyz-
ing continuing attacks beginning in May 2007) (last visited June 1, 2009). 
 4. See Jeremy Kirk, Expert: Russian Gov’t Ruled out in Estonia DDoS Attacks, IDG
NEWS SERVICE, June 1, 2007, http://www.computerworld.com/action/ 
article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=9022738. 
 5. See id.
 6. The trend may have been first widely popularized with the film WarGames,
though subsequent films such as The Matrix, Sneakers, and others have made hacking less 
of a novelty. See, e.g., Peter T. Leeson & Christopher J. Coyne, The Economics of Computer 
Hacking, 1 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 511, 513-14 (2005); Patrick S. Ryan, War, Peace, or Stale-
mate: Wargames, Wardialing, Wardriving, and the Emerging Market for Hacker Ethics,
VA. J.L. & TECH., Summer 2004, at 1, 10-12. The theme is so popular that, for example, the 
popular Die Hard movie series has used infrastructure hacking as a criminal tool in half of 
the movies (both the second and fourth movies) in the series. 
 7. See John Schwartz, When Computers Attack, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2007, at WK1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/24/weekinreview/24schwartz.html (“Whatev-
er form cyberwar might take, most experts have concluded that what happened in Estonia 
earlier this month was not an example.”). 
 8. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., CYBER STORM: EXERCISE REPORT (2006), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/prep_cyberstormreport_sep06.pdf (report of 
large-scale mock cyberattack); U.S. PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO 
SECURE CYBERSPACE (2003) [hereinafter CYBER STORM REPORT], available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/National_Cyberspace_Strategy.pdf. 
 9. See Landler & Markoff, supra note 1; see also CYBER STORM REPORT, supra note 8, 
at 11 (depicting a scenario wherein antiglobalization activists focused on damage to econ-
omy and public confidence in infrastructure). 
10. See U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, 2007 REPORT TO CONGRESS 95-96 
(2007), available at http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2007/report_to_congress.pdf (de-
termining that “China is actively engaging in cyber reconnaissance” as part of the devel-
opment of offensive cyber warfare capabilities). A determination of state sponsorship is 
likely problematic from a foreign relations perspective, so most evidence to date only hints 
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cyberterrorism, however, it appears that the less-dramatic plague of 
cybercrime is the more pressing concern of the day.11
 What remains clear is that these and other forms of cyberattacks 
can cause legitimate disruptions and damage to individuals, busi-
nesses, and even governmental entities.12 Attacks can vary in metho-
dology and complexity; distributed denial-of-service attacks require 
“botnets,” an army of compromised puppet computers,13 while a lone 
individual operating from one computer can compromise and deface a 
Web site. Underlying all of the attacks is the relative anonymity of 
the Internet and the jurisdictional and investigative questions in-
volved when the attacker is from another country. Given the technol-
ogy behind the Internet’s infrastructure, it appears that a purely 
reactive, investigative approach is insufficient to properly deter and 
punish such crime.14 While some recommendations exist to improve 
the level of information gathering and “trust” of the Internet,15 those 
                                                                                                                    
at the connection. See Mark Hosenball, Whacking Hackers, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 15, 2007, at 
10, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/42519 (noting Chinese denials); Nathan 
Thornburgh, The Invasion of the Chinese Cyberspies (and the Man Who Tried to Stop 
Them), TIME, Sept. 5, 2005, at 34, available at http://www.time.com/time/ 
magazine/article/0,9171,1098961,00.html (discussing Chinese “Titan Rain” hackers who 
penetrated a notable number of U.S. governmental computers). 
11. See Susan W. Brenner & Marc D. Goodman, In Defense of Cyberterrorism: An Ar-
gument for Anticipating Cyber-Attacks, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 44-52 (exploring 
reasons why cyberterrorism has not manifested). This Comment argues that while the cur-
rent costs of cybercrime may be untenable alone, the possibility of cyberterrorism should 
only deepen the resolve to develop a more comprehensive national response. See
HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 28 (2007), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_homelandsecurity_2007.pdf (dis-
cussing national security risks presented by inadequate cybersecurity). But see Reid Ski-
bell, Cybercrimes & Misdemeanors: A Reevaluation of the Computer Fraud & Abuse Act, 18 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 909, 920 n.62 (2003) (arguing that traditional visions of cyberterror-
ists causing death and mayhem are greatly overstated). 
12. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 
1013-28 (2001); see also Ellen Messmer & Denise Pappalardo, A Year After Meltdown: No 
Silver Bullet for DoS, NETWORK WORLD, Feb. 5, 2001, http://www.networkworld.com/ 
news/2001/0205ddos.html (describing a series of high-profile attacks in February 2000 that 
paralyzed major Web sites such as eTrade, eBay, and Yahoo); infra Part II.B. 
13. See Katyal, supra note 12, at 1026-27; see also infra note 65 and accompanying 
text (defining this form of attack generally). Various technical approaches exist to over-
whelm the target, such as pure bandwidth attacks (such as ICMP echo or ping floods) or 
connectivity attacks (such as SYN floods, described in Professor Katyal’s piece) which at-
tack the software layer. See, e.g., Abhiskek Singh, Demystifying Denial-of-Service Attacks, 
Part One, SECURITYFOCUS, Dec. 14, 2005, http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1853; see 
also Nazario, supra note 3 (noting that most attacks against Estonia were ICMP, rather 
than SYN, attacks).
 14. See, e.g., Douglas A. Barnes, Note, Deworming the Internet, 83 TEX. L. REV. 279, 
282-88 (2004); Kelly Cesare, Comment, Prosecuting Computer Virus Authors: The Need for 
an Adequate and Immediate International Solution, 14 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 135, 150-55 
(2001); see also infra Part II.B. 
 15. See, e.g., George Staikos, Improving Internet Trust and Security (Mar. 15, 2006) 
(unpublished position paper available at http://www.w3.org/2005/Security/usability-
ws/papers/33-staikos-improving-trust). Many suggestions focus on correcting technical and 
structural deficiencies in the Internet, where, for instance, trust may be placed inappro-
540 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:537 
efforts are often opposed by the libertarian impulses that have driven 
the Internet’s history and governance.16
 To solve this dilemma, commentators have discussed where liabil-
ity should accrue to properly motivate rational economic actors. Since 
the true malfeasant can elude capture so frequently, perhaps society 
could leverage other actors in the process. Some have recommended 
holding software companies liable in a manner similar to traditional 
product liability.17 Other commentators have suggested that individ-
ual users, who can become the unwitting participants in a botnet ei-
ther through a failure to maintain their computers or through a pre-
viously unpatched security hole, should be held to a standard of care 
and held liable for negligent maintenance.18 Another suggestion 
seeks to leverage internet service providers (ISPs) to filter or better 
monitor traffic.19 A more nuanced approach involves evaluating the 
                                                                                                                    
priately. See Security Fix: Brian Krebs on Computer Security, YouTube Censorship Sheds 
Light on Internet Trust, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/02/ 
pakistan_censorship_order_take.html (Feb. 25, 2008, 11:08 EST) (describing how Pakistani 
censorship of YouTube was briefly exported to many ISPs across the world due to funda-
mental Internet architecture). But even when two computers can firmly establish that they 
are communicating with each other correctly, there is no guarantee that the computer us-
ers are authorized users communicating for legitimate ends. Thus, an Orwellian extreme 
of this philosophy (and certainly not one advocated by Mr. Staikos) would involve excessive 
filtering: monitoring every single packet of information passing through the Internet, re-
constructing whole messages from the packets, and analyzing the patterns of data to make 
inferences about the true intent and goals of the users on both ends of the communication. 
 16. See, e.g., Robert E. Litan, Law and Policy in the Age of the Internet, 50 DUKE. L.J. 
1045, 1082-83 (2001). But see generally Amy Lynne Bomse, Note, The Dependence of Cyber-
space, 50 DUKE L.J. 1717 (2001) (examining the philosophical underpinnings and conse-
quences of the “libertarian” Internet narrative). Here, this Comment treads dangerously 
close to a wide variety of scholarship regarding the intersection and compatibility of cyber-
space and sovereign regulation, which is far beyond its scope. There are intrinsic connec-
tions between code, infrastructure, and regulation. See generally, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG,
CODE: VERSION 2.0 (2006). Even without direct government intervention, the market itself 
may be self-ordering in such a way as to limit the freedom to do harm, perhaps even by li-
miting the capability of end users to do any more than what devices allow. See generally
JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT (2008). This 
Comment is limited by assuming the self-governance model of the Internet from the outset 
and arguing that existing regulation makes that model incapable of adequately tackling 
cybercrime at a technical level. See also Neal Katyal, Community Self-Help, 1 J.L. ECON. &
POL’Y 33 (2005) (discussing community self-help model, both promises and challenges,  
for cyberspace). 
17. See Kevin R. Pinkney, Putting Blame Where Blame Is Due: Software Manufacturer 
and Customer Liability for Security-Related Software Failure, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 43, 
82 (2002) (advocating strict liability with post-software patch contributory negligence of 
users as a defense); Barnes, supra note 14, at 325-28 (advocating, among other solutions, 
lemon law liability based on established software quality standards). 
18. Cf. Michael L. Rustad, Private Enforcement of Cybercrime on the Electronic Fron-
tier, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 63, 107-13 (2001) (discussing tort liability under a duty to 
maintain, including discussion of current doctrinal barriers such as the economic loss rule); 
Barnes, supra note 14, at 328-29 (recommending increasing user valuation of security, but 
noting daunting enforcement problems). 
19. See, e.g., Lilian Edwards, Dawn of the Death of Distributed Denial of Service: How 
to Kill Zombies, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 23, 59-62 (2006) (discussing ISP interven-
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true costs of cybercrime and perhaps shifting liability rules to en-
courage “harmless” cybercrime that nevertheless reveals flaws and 
prevents more harmful exploitation.20
 This Comment agrees with the latter approach in principle, but 
seeks to focus on the self-governing nature of the Internet, particu-
larly the programming and hacking communities. While the term 
“hacker” has become commonly used in popular culture (if perhaps 
imprecisely),21 the terms “white hat” and “black hat” are less well 
known. The distinction lies primarily in the nature of intent; white-
hat hacking involves an attempt to prevent harmful exploitation by 
fixing problems with minimum of interference.22 By contrast, black-
hat hacking involves intrusion and exploitation, often for malicious 
(and frequently criminal) purposes.23 This Comment argues that cur-
rent laws and developing trends within the law may be inhibiting the 
white hats without sufficiently deterring cybercriminals and other 
assorted black hats.  
 By creating proper incentives and safe harbors for such “ethical 
hacking,” society can take better advantage of the wealth of available 
talent and initiative that has spurred the development of the Inter-
net over the past two decades. To the extent that laws deter unmali-
cious discovery of software exploits and misconfigured computers, the 
laws must reflect a competing gain in terms of deterrence of mali-
cious activity. Given the complexities of investigating and punishing 
                                                                                                                    
tion as a deterrent to spam and DDoS traffic); Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, 
Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 WASH. L. REV. 335, 382-90, 407 (2005) (advocating ISP liabili-
ty upon actual notice of harmful behavior); see also Posting of Craig Labovitz to Security to 
the Core: The Arbor Networks Security Blog, 2008 Worldwide Infrastructure Security Re-
port, http://asert.arbornetworks.com/2008/11/2008-worldwide-infrastructure-security-
report (Nov. 11, 2008, 8:00) (discussing recent survey of ISPs and noting increased ability 
of to detect DDoS attacks at the ISP level). At its most effective, this approach would inhi-
bit the ability of flooding attacks from botnets, but it would not address other aspects of 
cybercrime which are low-traffic in nature. 
20. See Note, Immunizing the Internet, or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love 
the Worm, 119 HARV. L REV. 2442, 2448, 2453 (2006) [hereinafter Immunizing the Internet]
(arguing that social benefits of minimally destructive cybercrime may outweigh costs and 
that such cybercrime should be encouraged). Without focusing on hackers, another recom-
mendation seeks to employ a similar skill base in the open source software community. See
Benjamin R. Jones, Comment, Virtual Neighborhood Watch: Open Source Software and 
Community Policing Against Cybercrime, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 601 (2007). 
21. See Skibell, supra note 11, at 919-21. The hacking community prefers the term 
“cracker” for those who intentionally breach the security of a system for mischief or profit. 
Compare ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE NEW HACKER’S DICTIONARY 130 (3d ed. 1996) (definition 
of “cracker”), with id. at 233-35 (definitions of “hacker” and “hacker ethic”).  
22. See Immunizing the Internet, supra note 20, at 2457 (discussing the “white hat” 
model); Gerard Steube, A Logistic Regression Model to Distinguish White Hat and Black 
Hat Hackers 11, 13 (June 2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Capella University) (on 
file with author) (defining “white hat” hackers, partly as counterpoints to “black hat” hackers). 
23. See Steube, supra note 22, at 11; see also infra notes 105-13 and accompanying 
text (explaining an alternative to this binary white-black distinction and explaining why 
the binary distinction is retained for the purposes of this Comment). 
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cybercrime, however, that counterbalance does not appear to  
exist presently. 
 In Part II, this Comment will discuss the nature of cybercrime 
and why this counterbalance may be impossible under current tech-
nology and legal structures. Part II will delve into the complexity of 
software and the manner in which exploitable bugs and configura-
tions exist. It will address the current state of how these security 
holes are exploited and the relevant criminal market that is exploit-
ing them. The existence of both organized and unorganized elements, 
combined with a wide range of national sources with varying legal 
structures, ensures that no single approach to the problem can be ef-
fective. Finally, Part II concludes with a discussion of the “ethical” 
hacking community as a counterpoint to cybercriminals. 
 Next, Part III notes that criminal law and attendant civil liability 
may be insufficient to properly distinguish the different intents of 
white-hat and black-hat hackers. Since the latter have financial in-
centives to engage in their activity, they are less likely to be deterred 
than ethical hackers, even when the white-hat hackers would cause 
little to no social harm by their “unauthorized” activities. While an 
intention to access a computer in excess of authority must be shown, 
an exceedingly low bar for damages triggers both civil and criminal 
liability. This Part will also explore both recent international devel-
opments as well as proposals that have recently been advanced in the 
United States Congress. 
 Finally, Part IV offers modest but specific proposals that would 
provide proper incentives for self-help techniques such as ethical 
hacking. These would involve expanding existing safe harbors under 
civil law and establishing a regulated safe harbor under criminal 
law, such that intent to hack ethically can be demonstrated by adhe-
rence to the requirements.  
 To establish a more narrow scope, this Comment does not address 
those cybercrime offenses that do not relate even indirectly to soft-
ware or hardware vulnerabilities or misconfigurations. Some exam-
ples would include cyberstalking24 or fraud25 that does not involve 
                                                                                                                    
24. See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 12, at 1034-37. 
25. See Susan W. Brenner, Cybercrime Metrics: Old Wine, New Bottles?, 9 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 13, at 4 (2004), http://www.vjolt.net/vol9/issue4/v9i4_a13-Brenner.pdf. Professor 
Brenner’s list includes forms of fraud that can be perpetrated through both technical 
means and more traditional “social engineering.” A common version of the latter is advance 
fee or “4-1-9” fraud. Id. at 4 n.10. The distinction drawn here is whether cyberspace is used 
purely as a communication medium or whether the automated or software-specific features 
of computers are employed. As an illustration for the purposes of this Comment, obtaining 
someone’s credit card information by pretending to be a service representative over the 
phone would be “social,” while creating a Web site which fakes the credentials of the credit 
card’s Web site or using software that swipes online form data before it is encrypted  
is “technical.” 
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hacking. Also, this Comment does not directly address “internal” of-
fenses, such as when an employee steals passwords or maliciously 
misconfigures a company’s computer system, though it may be possi-
ble to find indirect solutions to some of those problems by way of the 
solutions suggested herein.26
II.   THE EXPLOIT LANDSCAPE
A.   The Complexity of Programs 
 A basic principle of computer software design is that there will 
always be a trade-off between complexity and security.27 In modern 
terms, complexity can take many forms, such as features and op-
tions,28 interoperability between software packages,29 or combinations 
of hardware architecture and compiled software.30 A complete test of 
software would involve an exhaustive test of every possible state 
with every possible attack, which is not merely impracticable but 
outright impossible.31 While software quality assurance does fre-
quently test a large number of permutations, users who frequently 
read release notes from software patches may find solutions for bugs 
that occur in obscure and specific combinations of hardware  
and software. 
 Given the economic pressures to bring software to market, cer-
tainly some level of error is expected with newly released software.32
                                                                                                                    
 26. These sort of offenses are commonly prosecuted; for a recent example of rogue em-
ployee behavior, see Press Release, U.S. Att’y, Dist. N.J., Former Systems Administrator 
Admits Planting “Logic Bomb” in Company Computers (Sept. 19, 2007), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nj/press/files/pdffiles/lin0919rel.pdf. Though this behavior ap-
pears difficult to detect externally, some vulnerabilities such as “backdoor” passwords or 
intentionally opened ports might be detectable. 
27. E.g., NIELS FERGUSON & BRUCE SCHNEIER, PRACTICAL CRYPTOGRAPHY 5, 39 
(2003). Essentially, more features and parts means more features and parts to test. 
28. Id. at 5 (“Complexity is the worst enemy of security, and it almost always comes in 
the form of features or options.”). 
29. See, e.g., Gregg Keizer, Year-Old QuickTime Bug Gives Hackers New Drive-by At-
tack, COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 13, 2007, http://www.computerworld.com/action/ 
article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=9036418 (describing potential high-risk 
exploit of popular Web browser plug-in and differential effects on various Web browsers); 
Gregg Keizer, Update: Buggy Game DRM Puts Windows Users at Risk, COMPUTERWORLD,
Nov. 7, 2007, http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic 
&articleId=9045978 (describing potential exploit of common game antipiracy software and 
risks for different user configurations). 
30. See, e.g., John Leyden, Hacking Contest Publicity Stunt Backfires, REGISTER, Apr. 
25, 2001, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/04/25/hacking_contest_publicity_stunt_backfires 
(indicating “successful” penetration of security product by exploiting a specific hard-
ware/operating system combination). See generally Lou Morgan, Compilers and How They 
Work: An Overview, http://www.skepticfiles.org/cowtext/comput~1/compiler.htm (noting 
under “Code Generation” heading that when software programs are compiled, they are 
translated into hardware and operating system-specific format) (last visited June 1, 2009). 
 31. FERGUSON & SCHNEIER, supra note 27, at 5. 
32. See Micah Schwalb, Exploit Derivatives & National Security, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH.
162, 168-69 (2007) (arguing that software bugs are inevitable externalities); cf. Barnes, su-
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The current distribution model relies upon the relative ease of access 
to the Internet for distributing software patches. In essence, software 
is knowingly released in a “buggy” form—either with an active list of 
known bugs or through an inability to test every aspect of software. 
The ready availability of patches has induced tolerance of such buggy 
software within the market, wherein the relevant measure is not 
whether software has errors but rather how many and how severe 
they are. Patch release schedules can vary between companies as 
well; some software is patched whenever a bug is repaired, whereas 
other software is patched on a fixed schedule.33 Further, recent de-
velopments such as automated patching systems have improved the 
extent to which patches are applied to computers by requiring mi-
nimal or no maintenance on the part of end users.34
 In this release-and-fix-later distribution model, the software de-
veloper relies upon error reports from users, essentially using cus-
tomers in the capacity of an extended quality assurance group. An 
excessively “buggy” release risks market disapproval of the product, 
so each company must choose how to strike the appropriate balance. 
Used effectively, which is to say not angering too many customers, 
this approach allows the developer to prioritize its efforts, fixing the 
errors that either affect the greatest number of users or present the 
simpler technical solutions. However, this scheme relies upon the in-
ability of a company to cost-effectively solve its technical problems 
prior to release—either for lack of physical testers on payroll or the 
time it would take to identify errors in the absence of incoming reve-
nue. At least one commentator has noted the incentives for software 
manufacturers to actually make use of latent security concerns to 
compel upgrades and authenticate validly purchased software.35
 This business model is not without its own flaws, of course; occa-
sionally a patch can create a new problem even as it fixes an old 
one.36 This underscores the problems inherent in software testing. 
                                                                                                                    
pra note 14, at 302-05 (arguing that it is not technologically impossible to build bug-free 
software, at least for known bugs). 
33. See Robert McMillan, Adobe Moving to Monthly Security Patch Schedule, IDG
NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 14, 2005, http://www.computerworld.com/softwaretopics/software/ 
story/0,10801,107072,00.html (noting Adobe’s shift from ad hoc to monthly patch release 
schedule). However, even strict schedules may not be strictly adhered to if the threat to 
end users is high enough. See, e.g., Sharon Gaudin, Microsoft Patches .ANI Flaw, but More 
Attacks Expected, INFORMATIONWEEK, Apr. 3, 2007, http://www.informationweek.com/ 
windows/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=198702260. 
34. See Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Law and Economics of Software 
Security, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 325-26 (2006). 
35. See Barnes, supra note 14, at 295-97. 
36. See, e.g., John Leyden, MS DNS Patch Snuffs Net Connection for ZoneAlarm Us-
ers, REGISTER, July 9, 2008, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/07/09/ 
ms_dns_patch_zonealarm_woes (describing Windows patch to recent DNS vulnerability, 
which prevented users of the ZoneAlarm software firewall from accessing the Internet); 
Brian Prince, Microsoft ANI Patch Causes Problems with Third-Party Apps, EWEEK, Apr. 
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Software “bugs” can be contained in only a few lines of code,37 whe-
reas most software is significantly larger and operating systems may 
be on the order of tens of millions of lines of code.38 Given the level of 
interaction between various components in some software packages, 
it may not be clear what effect some changes will have on other as-
pects of a program’s functionality.39
 Further complicating this model is the adversarial nature of se-
cure programming—the nature of the threat is constantly changing 
precisely because it is a human threat.40 New forms of attack mate-
rialize in response to countermeasures of old forms of attack, and the 
cycle continues. A security system is only as strong as its weakest 
link, and it is virtually impossible to test every link at any time, thus 
ensuring a near-constant cat-and-mouse game.41 While it is theoreti-
cally possible to release an error-free software package, it remains 
both practically impossible and effectively quixotic since software de-
velopers cannot predict all future forms of attack.42
 Nor would error-free software solve the vulnerabilities that exist 
due to the configuration of software and the actions of users. Even 
when software performs as intended, software cannot fully protect 
users from themselves. Some recent examples of this problem include 
viral attachments to email,43 malicious macros in documents,44 and 
                                                                                                                    
9, 2007, http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,2112416,00.asp (noting unanticipated bugs 
caused by patch described in Gaudin, supra note 33). 
 37. For instance, a buffer overflow bug can be introduced in a single line by simply us-
ing an unsecure function, such as “scanf()” in the standard ANSI C library. See, e.g., Danny 
Kalev, Avoiding Buffer Overflows, ITWORLD, Dec. 18, 2001, http://www.itworld.com/nl/ 
lnx_sec/12182001. 
38. See, e.g., David Pogue, Vista Wins on Looks. As for Lacks. . ., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 
2006, at C1 (describing Windows Vista as consisting of approximately fifty million lines  
of code). 
 39. For an insightful (and unfiltered) anecdotal discussion of the effects of interde-
pendency on the Windows Vista development process, see Posting of Philip Su to The 
World as Best as I Remember It, http://blogs.msdn.com/philipsu/archive/2006/06/14/ 
Broken-Windows-Theory.aspx (June 14, 2006, 14:38). 
40. See FERGUSON & SCHNEIER, supra note 27, at 11-12. 
 41. This Comment uses the term “malware” broadly to refer to software that performs 
harmful functions on a computer. Traditional categories include “worms” (which self-
propagate), “viruses” (which do not), “trojan horses” (which are harmful functions embed-
ded with more innocuous software), or “logic bombs” (which are harmful pieces of software 
which execute under specific conditions). See Katyal, supra note 12, at 1023-26. Malware 
may be also categorized by function, such as “keyloggers” (which capture keyboard input) 
or “form grabbers” (which acquire data submitted on Internet forms). See Scott Berinato, A
Layman’s Glossary of Malware Terms, CIO, Oct. 8, 2007, http://www.cio.com/article/print/135453. 
42. Cf. Capers Jones, Software Defect-Removal Efficiency, 29 COMPUTER 94, 94-95 
(1996) (asserting that no formalized defect removal process captures all errors). 
43. See, e.g., Cesare, supra note 14, at 143-45 (describing two well-known email virus-
es, Melissa and ILOVEYOU). These typically involve the user executing files attached to 
email. 
44. See, e.g., id. at 143-44 (noting that although Melissa spread through emailing it-
self, the code was a script embedded in Microsoft Word documents). These typically ex-
ecute when the document is first opened. E.g., Microsoft.com, WD97: Frequently Asked 
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cleverly disguised malware that appears to be a different kind of 
file.45 As a result, commercial software frequently installs in an over-
secure state, requiring manual intervention on the part of users to 
expose vulnerabilities.46 These settings typically require extra steps 
on the part of end users, which may lead some to change the configu-
ration merely for convenience or expedience.47 Many users are likely 
to be frustrated by the almost incessant pop-up windows asking per-
mission to perform basic tasks. Occasionally, even basic functionality 
requires exposure; for example, security software may not allow cer-
tain types of software behavior unless the configuration is changed in 
a way that makes a computer less secure.48 Further, concerns about 
the reliability of patches may lead users to disable automatic patch-
ing features, even when they are available for a given piece of soft-
ware.49 Given the complexity of software and the interdependencies 
                                                                                                                    
Questions About Word Macro Viruses, http://support.microsoft.com/kb/163932/EN-US (last 
visited June 1, 2009). Many office suites now default to secure settings that prevent this 
from happening. E.g., Microsoft.com, Change the Outlook Security Level for Macro Virus 
Protection, http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/outlook/HP052850551033.aspx (last visited 
June 1, 2009) (“To protect your computer against macro viruses, the default security level 
in Microsoft Outlook is High.”).
45. See, e.g., Brian Krebs, Cyber Crime 2.0, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Dec. 20, 2007, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/20/AR2007122001266.html 
(describing a variety of techniques that the “Storm worm” uses to disguise itself). This 
technique is easily employed against even more sophisticated users, as filenames and sizes 
can be altered to appear genuine. Additional verification techniques such as file checksum 
cryptographic hashes have become recommended to avoid such bait-and-switch problems. 
See, e.g., Microsoft Corp., Availability and Description of the File Checksum Integrity Ve-
rifier Utility, http://support.microsoft.com/kb/841290 (last visited June 1, 2009). 
 46. For example, more highly secured states of many pre-Vista Windows operating 
systems will prevent the installation of most code without administrative privileges, which 
would prevent accidental click-through installations or, more recently, mere access instal-
lations while Web browsing. See, e.g., N.Y. Cyber Sec. & Critical Infrastructure Coordina-
tion, Advisory 2007-025 (Dec. 11, 2007) http://www.cscic.state.ny.us/advisories/2007/ 
12_11.cfm (describing recent vulnerabilities stemming from merely accessing malicious 
Web pages while browsing with administrator privileges); see also Stanford Univ. Info. Sec. 
Off., Secure Computing: Securing a Windows XP Desktop, http://www.stanford.edu/group/ 
security/securecomputing/xp.html (describing dangers of administrative privileges and 
good end-user practices) (last visited June 1, 2009). 
 47. Indeed, the author concedes membership in this class of users. See Mitch Tulloch, 
Running Windows Under Non-Admin Accounts (Sept. 15, 2005), 
http://www.windowsnetworking.com/articles_tutorials/Running-Windows-Under-Non-Admin-
Accounts.html (describing a variety of difficulties in operating without administrative pri-
vileges and providing a tutorial for time-consuming workarounds). 
48. See J.D. Biersdorfer, Q & A, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2006, at C10 (discussing security 
settings, notably describing how Microsoft’s Internet Explorer “High security” setting lim-
its functionality of some Web pages); Patrick J. Cunningham, Are Cookies Hazardous to 
Your Privacy?, 36 INFO. MGMT. J. 52, 53 (2002) (noting difficulty in Web browsing with 
tracking cookies disabled by default). For a timely example, potential conflicts with securi-
ty and exam software at the author’s law school have led to the recommendation that users 
disable their firewalls entirely during exams.  
49. See, e.g., Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 34, at 340-41 (noting that care must 
be taken with software liability rules to avoid patches that create more problems than they 
solve); Microsoft Corp., Description of the Automatic Updates Feature in Windows, 
http://support.microsoft.com/kb/294871 (last visited June 1, 2009); see also supra note 36 
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between different pieces of software, the normal user is frequently ill-
equipped to understand the full ramifications of his or her decisions.50
 As a brief aside, this Comment uses the terms “vulnerability” and 
“exploit” broadly. The terms themselves seem to indicate technical 
issues in everyday usage. However, the number of purely technical 
exploits is probably quite limited; most attacks are variations on 
common technical themes.51 Many forms of attack require some level 
of user intervention, whether it is opening an infected file, clicking on 
a malicious hyperlink, sending personal information to a phishing 
Web site, or manually adjusting security settings. To this end, this 
Comment defines an exploit in terms of behavior that a reasonable, 
trusting software user would expect from his or her own uncompro-
mised computer and from foreign systems, assuming them to be be-
nign in nature.52 With such broad brush strokes, there is plenty of 
gray area; the guidepost here is software behavior that could result 
in financial or privacy loss or that could allow an attacker to arbitra-
rily use the computer to his or her own ends. 
 In sum, given the staggering number of permutations to test, the 
ever-adapting nature of exploits, the realistic limitations of the soft-
ware development market, and the possibly inadvertent complicity of 
end users, software vulnerabilities will remain an ever-present chal-
lenge. These two key players in the typical cyberattack equation, 
software developers and end users,53 become the unwitting accom-
plices of those individuals and organizations who are exploiting  
these vulnerabilities. 
B.   The “Black Hats” and the Cybercrime Market 
 While not a completely lawless place, the Internet offers ample 
anonymity for those who wish to remain undetected. Computer users 
can be identified by a number of indirect means, such as their IP ad-
                                                                                                                    
and accompanying text (noting that sometimes even the patches themselves require 
patches). These types of problems indicate that it may be reasonable behavior to disable 
automatic updating and wait until early adopters have reasonably vetted the patches. 
50. See Alex Zaharov-Reutt, Survey: Consumers Don’t Understand Online Security,
ITWIRE, Oct. 2, 2007, http://www.itwire.com/content/view/14705/1103 (discussing report 
indicating distinction between users’ understanding of basic security principles and reali-
ty); see also Barnes, supra note 14, at 297-99 (arguing that both isolated users underva-
luing security and different users variably valuing security produces user errors). 
 51. See infra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 52. For a more detailed distinction of various forms of attack, see Hahn & Layne-
Farrar, supra note 34, at 288-93. 
 53. The term “end users” is applied liberally here for ease of use, without intending to 
offend information technology (IT) professionals. In this broad model, system administra-
tors and other IT professionals fall into the “end user” category but clearly are more apt to 
understand the issues than a typical home user. It is advised, however, not to refer to your 
system administrator as an “end user” at any time.  
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dress54 or browser history by way of a file cache or “cookies.”55 How-
ever, most of these means have effective countermeasures—at the 
simplest technical level, IP addresses may be forged or “spoofed,”56
cookies may be avoided or deleted,57 and server logs may be falsified, 
for example.58 In the United States, even typical home users have 
been able to mount strong challenges to identification by IP address 
alone.59 Combined with technical savvy, the Internet’s basic architec-
ture allows individuals to conduct activity with less fear of detection 
than a physical presence would raise. 
 This moderately unregulated environment couples with the ease 
of use and replicative abilities of computers in which the same task 
can be automated or duplicated any number of times by even unso-
phisticated users.60 For example, consider a hypothetical pyramid 
scheme or similar form of fraud. At the least technical level, individ-
uals would be solicited personally. To reach a wider audience in less 
time, some method of postal service could be used with each offer 
                                                                                                                    
54. See Techweb, TechEncyclopedia, IP Address Definition, 
http://www.techweb.com/encyclopedia/defineterm.jhtml?term=IPAddress (last visited June 
1, 2009). Note that while every computer has a unique IP address, these addresses may 
apply to a more limited network than the whole Internet. This typically occurs in a home 
network with a router; the internet service provider (ISP) provides a global address to the 
router, and all the computers behind that router share that address for the purpose of ex-
ternal communication, using separate local addresses to distinguish one another. See
Techweb, TechEncyclopedia, NAT Definition, http://www.techweb.com/encyclopedia/ 
defineterm.jhtml?term=Nat (last visited June 1, 2009). 
55. See Techweb, TechEncyclopedia, Cookie Definition, http://www.techweb.com/ 
encyclopedia/defineterm.jhtml?term=Cookie (last visited June 1, 2009).  
 56. See David Moore et al., Inferring Internet Denial-of-Service Activity, 24 ACM
TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER SYS. 115, 118 (2006) (noting that “spoofing,” or forging, an IP 
address is a common technique used by attackers); Michael Lee et al., Comment, Electronic 
Commerce, Hackers, and the Search for Legitimacy: A Regulatory Proposal, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 839, 848-49 (1999) (describing spoofing). 
57. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 48 (cookies); David Shamah, Spy vs. Spider,
JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 14, 2003, at 22 (discussing browser cache and hidden system files 
that serve tracking purposes). Forensic techniques can frequently recover data from files 
that are merely deleted once, of course. Secure data-removal procedures involve multiple 
“rewrites” over the same physical location on a hard drive. See Danny Bradbury, Your 
Guide to Retrieving Deleted Files, COMPUTER WKLY., June 19, 2007, at 44, 44.  
 58. These techniques are described as “simple” in comparison to the growing trend of 
“antiforensics.” See Scott Berinato, The Rise of Anti-Forensics, CSO ONLINE, June 8, 2007, 
http://www.csoonline.com/article/221208/The_Rise_of_Anti_Forensics?page=7 (quoting  
security researcher Vincent Liu, “[The attackers] contaminate the scene so badly you’d 
have to spend unbelievable money to unravel it . . . . [and] make giving up the smartest 
business decision”). 
 59. Typically, an individual or organization would need to obtain an IP address and 
timestamp, then request records from the Internet Service Provider (ISP) regarding which 
user held that address at that time. See Declan McCullagh, P2P’s Little Secret, CNET 
NEWS, July 8, 2003, http://www.news.com/2100-1029_3-1023735.html (discussing identifi-
cation & subpoena procedure, as well as technical responses); cf. Ken Fisher, The RIAA, IP 
Addresses, and Evidence, ARS TECHNICA, Aug. 3, 2006, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/ 
post/20060803-7416.html (discussing cases that reveal other physical evidentiary prob-
lems, such as multiple users of a computer, which complicate IP address identification).
60. See Brenner, supra note 25, at 6. 
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handwritten. Next, a printing machine could be used to automate the 
production method but addresses and postage would still need to be 
applied by hand. Then, connecting a database to the printing ma-
chine would automate the addressing feature. Eventually the postal 
service would permit customers to print their own postage in an au-
tomated way, and thus the process is fully automated but still  
dependent upon a number of physical limitations such as supplies 
and delivery. 
 With the advent of electronic mail, however, lists of indeterminate 
size can be contacted with minimal effort, with various servers per-
forming all of the replicative work.61 This level of automation can be 
applied to many, but not all, tasks that fall under the rubric of cyber-
crime.62 Crafting new techniques to penetrate complex security sys-
tems and discovering new vulnerabilities in existing software are 
generally limited to a highly skilled group.63 Once a technical form of 
attack has been modularized as a standalone program, it can easily 
be disseminated to a wider range of less sophisticated users. The pe-
jorative “script-kiddies” derives from this; attackers using pre-
fabricated tools can still affect computers that have not applied the 
appropriate countermeasures.64 Some forms of attack, such as distri-
buted denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, require this level of automa-
tion to overwhelm their targets with a massive number of requests 
for information.65 Since a single computer cannot generate enough 
                                                                                                                    
61. Id. Granted, there is initial investment required to reach this “point-and-click” 
level. For example, lists of valid e-mail addresses for potential customers would need to be 
purchased, though this is rarely difficult. See William J. Fenrich, Common Law Protection 
of Individuals’ Rights in Personal Information, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 951, 951-53 (1996) 
(describing email lists and activities of list brokers). Then, some organizational effort to 
manage these addresses would be taken, though software can ease those tasks as well.
62. See Katyal, supra note 12, at 1006 (discussing the low “perpetration cost”  
of cybercrime). 
 63. The techniques employed here are not always technical. For a primer on social 
engineering, see Lee et al., supra note 56, at 858-59. See generally KEVIN D. MITNICK &
WILLIAM L. SIMON, THE ART OF DECEPTION: CONTROLLING THE HUMAN ELEMENT OF 
SECURITY (2002). Limited to technical forms of attack, however, most hackers (approx-
imately ninety percent) have limited technical proficiency. Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra
note 34, at 296 (citing GABRIEL WEIMANN, CYBERTERRORISM: HOW REAL IS THE THREAT? 9 
(U.S. Inst. of Peace, Spec. Rep. 119, Dec. 2004), available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/ 
specialreports/sr119.pdf). 
64. See Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 34, at 296 (“The term ‘script-kiddies’ refers 
to relatively unskilled young hackers who deploy malicious hacking tools . . . developed by 
others.”); see also Scott Zambo, Note, Digital La Cosa Nostra: The Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act’s Failure to Punish and Deter Organized Crime, 33 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 551, 553-55 (2007) (differentiating “script-kiddies” from “hackers”  
and “crackers”). 
 65. This is the same sort of attack as was used against Estonian servers. See supra
notes 1-5 and accompanying text. This form of attack typically involves generating an ex-
cessive number of seemingly legitimate requests for information from the target, in high 
enough volume that the server cannot respond either due to bandwidth or hard-
ware/software constraints. See US-CERT, Home Network Security, http://www.us-
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traffic to overwhelm a Web server with sufficient resources, an at-
tack needs to be coordinated from multiple sources.66 The typical 
form of a DDoS attack comes by way of a “botnet,” which is a virtual 
army of compromised computers that will carry out the commands of 
a remote handler.67 Compromising a sufficient number of computers 
to affect a well-equipped Web server requires automated exploitative 
techniques such as viruses or worms; it would be impractical to com-
promise each computer directly.68
 While botnets can be created for curiosity and mischief, the more 
significant activity has become criminal in nature. Far from mere ha-
rassment, sophisticated criminal groups have started to expand their 
activities into the Internet.69 At the (arguably) more legitimate end of 
the spectrum, botnets can be employed to e-mail spam messages, 
making it difficult to trace the original source of the messages.70 Bot-
nets can also be employed in “click fraud” schemes, falsely register-
ing valid referrals through pay-per-click advertising schemes.71 Com-
promised computers can be infected with malware which directly si-
phons off sensitive information.72 And botnets’ capacity to perform 
                                                                                                                    
cert.gov/reading_room/home-network-security/#III-B-3 (last visited June 1, 2009); see also
supra note 13 (describing denial-of-service attacks generally). 
 66. Technically anything which denies service, such as jamming a user’s wireless 
network, would count as a denial-of-service attack. However, this Comment avoids that 
level of nuance to focus on the traditional server-attack connotation. Similarly, while coor-
dination implies the design of a master user, legitimate use such as externally-linking 
news Web sites may also overcome Web servers. These are not attacks per se, but have the 
same net effect. See Stephen Adler, The Slashdot Effect, an Analysis of Three Internet Pub-
lications, http://linuxgazette.net/issue38/adler1.html (describing the “Slashdot effect” 
named after the popular externally-linking news site, http://slashdot.org) (last visited June 
1, 2009). 
67. See Edwards, supra note 19, at 24-26. 
68. Id. at 25 (“A single hacker, however determined, cannot easily make enough page 
requests, or send enough emails, to knock down the server of, say, Worldpay, or the FBI,  
or CNN.”). 
 69. See, e.g., ZITTRAIN, supra note 16, at 46-47 (“The economics is implacable: viruses 
are now valuable properties, and that makes for a burgeoning industry in virus making 
where volume matters.”); Lauren L. Sullins, Comment, “Phishing” For a Solution; Domes-
tic and International Approaches to Decreasing Online Identity Theft, 20 EMORY INT’L L.
REV. 397, 417-18 (2006). 
70. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT GAO-07-705, CYBERCRIME:
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENTITIES FACE CHALLENGES IN ADDRESSING CYBER THREATS 8 (2007) 
[hereinafter GAO CHALLENGES], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07705.pdf; 
U.S. FBI, Operation: Bot Roast, ‘Bot-Herders’ Charged as Part of Initiative (June 13, 
2007), http://www.fbi.gov/page2/june07/botnet061307.htm [hereinafter FBI Bot Roast]. 
71. See Thomas Claburn, Bots Driving Click Fraud, INFORMATIONWEEK, July 19, 
2007, http://www.informationweek.com/news/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=201002161; FBI 
Bot Roast, supra note 70. 
72. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, Corporate In-
formation Security, and Securities Regulation, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 129, 144 (2005); see 
also supra note 41 (defining malware and capabilities of specific types). 
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DDoS attacks can be employed for extortive and harmful purposes; 
botnets have become a technological protection “racket.”73
 Newly developed exploits that cannot be detected by existing 
countermeasures may be more dangerous still.74 These new methods 
of attack can conceptually be configured for a specific target, whether 
a particular business entity or the whole of cyberspace.75 With an ef-
fective attack, cybercriminals can obtain sensitive information, such 
as customer databases or trade secrets, and either sell the informa-
tion or extort the original victim.76 For this reason, a black market 
has developed regarding these software vulnerabilities—attacks that 
can be sold to those best positioned to make use of them.77 Reactive 
countermeasures will always be insufficient to deal with new attacks; 
only identification and elimination of the vulnerability before some-
one takes advantage of it will prevent the harm.78
 Technical exploits and other methods of attack have significant fi-
nancial consequences for both businesses and individuals and simi-
larly represent lucrative opportunities for criminals. Recent studies 
place the annual costs of cybercrime in the tens of billions of dollars, 
                                                                                                                    
73. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 16, at 46 (“For example, a criminal can attack an Inter-
net gambling Web site and then extort payment to make the attacks stop. The going rate 
for a botnet to launch such an attack is reputed to be about $50,000 a day.”); Zambo, supra
note 64, at 561-62; Grant Gross, Investigator Urges Firms to Report Cybercrime, NETWORK 
WORLD, Aug. 28, 2006, at 10. 
74. See Carey Nachenberg, Computer Virus-Antivirus Coevolution, 40 COMM. ACM 46, 
47-51 (1997) (describing evolution of antivirus technology as well as noting limitations). 
The constant evolution of attack methods makes updating antimalware software extremely 
important; analyses of how commercial software fares against new forms of attack indicate 
spotty results. See, e.g., ANDREAS CLEMENTI, ANTI-VIRUS COMPARATIVE NO. 16, at 2-6 
(2007), http://www.av-comparatives.org/seiten/ergebnisse/report16.pdf. 
 75. A common term regarding these exploits is “zero-day,” which technically means an 
exploit developed on the same day that a vulnerability is publicly announced. See Tech-
Web, TechEncyclopedia, Zero-Day Exploit Definition, http://www.techweb.com/ 
encyclopedia/defineterm.jhtml?term=zero-dayexploit (last visited June 1, 2009). Exploits 
may exist before a vulnerability is publicly announced, may be equally effective any time 
after announcement before countermeasures exist, or may still affect users who have not 
applied countermeasures. 
 76. One recent trend is so-called “ransomware”—exploits that lock crucial data on 
one’s computer until the user pays a fee for the password to unlock the data. See, e.g., Noah 
Schiffman, The Reversible Denial-of-Resource CryptoViral Extortion Attack, NETWORK 
WORLD, June 25, 2008, http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/29333. Though the 
ransomware trend may not be widely known, it represents a small fraction of a well-
catalogued data breach trend. One recent Congressional analysis appended the Privacy 
Rights Clearinghouse Chronology of Data Breaches to its report, which catalogued the 
(public) loss of over 154 million individual records From 2005 through May 2007. S. REP.
NO. 110-70, at 33-163 (2007). As of March 28, 2009, that number exceeded 253 million. 
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Chronology of Data Breaches, 
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm#CP (last visited June 1, 2009). 
77. See Schwalb, supra note 32, at 174 (citing Jaziar Radianti & Jose J. Gonzalez, 
Toward a Dynamic Modeling of the Vulnerability Black Market 2-3 (Oct. 2006) (unpub-
lished manuscript), available at http://wesii.econinfosec.org/draft.php?paper_id=44). 
78. See infra Part II.C. 
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though most of this stems from identity theft.79 The potential value 
has led to the consolidation of online criminal activity into “cyber-
gangs.”80 The increasing level of technical sophistication and criminal 
savvy is likely to increase the overall efficiency of cybercrime in the 
foreseeable future.81
 At the same time, the risk of capture and prosecution for the be-
havior appears to remain low.82 The general anonymity of the Inter-
net and the capacity to act through compromised intermediaries or 
self-replicating malware combine to limit the risk of detection.83 Even 
when criminal activity is detected, law enforcement officers may con-
front a host of jurisdictional issues from a variety of nations, some of 
which do not have computer crime laws comparable to the investigat-
ing jurisdiction.84 Similar problems also exist for private tort reme-
dies.85 While efforts continue to standardize and update the laws of 
                                                                                                                    
79. See, e.g., GAO CHALLENGES, supra note 70, at 2 (estimating from FBI reports total 
losses of $67.2 billion in 2005, projecting losses of $49.3 billion in 2006 due to identity theft 
alone); Matwyshyn, supra note 72, at 138 (“In 2003 alone, the social costs of information 
vulnerability totaled approximately $60 billion in the United States.”). 
80. See Rustad, supra note 18, at 73-74 (Eastern European influence); Zambo, supra
note 64, at 555-62 (cybergangs generally); see also Neal Weinberg, Kasperskys on Cyber-
crime: Don’t Blame the Russian Mafia and Why We Need Anti-Anti-Anti Virus Software,
NETWORK WORLD, Feb. 1, 2007, http://www.networkworld.com/news/2007/020107-
kaspersky-cybercrime.html (containing an interview with security professionals who argue 
that connections between traditional criminal elements and cybercriminals is overstated). 
81. See Peter Sommer, Criminalising Hacking Tools, 3 DIGITAL INVESTIGATION 68 
(2006) (citing the general upward trend of sophistication first noted in U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT GAO/AIMD-96-84, INFORMATION SECURITY: COMPUTER 
ATTACKS AT DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POSE INCREASING RISKS 15, fig.1.2 (1996)); Scott 
Berinato, Who’s Stealing Your Passwords? Global Hackers Create a New Online Crime 
Economy, CIO, Sept. 17, 2007, http://www.cio.com/article/print/135500 (describing a securi-
ty researcher’s experience analyzing a cybercriminal organization). 
82. See Brenner, supra note 25, at 6-9 (describing factors which inhibit prosecutions); 
Laura J. Nicholson et al., Computer Crimes, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 207, 231-33 (2000) (offer-
ing reasons for low number of prosecutions prior to 1996 amendments to Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act); Jennifer Stisa Granick et al., National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers, Electronic Frontier Foundation, and Sentencing Project Public Comment (Feb. 
19, 2003), available at http://w2.eff.org/Legislation/CFAA/1030_Comments_2-19-03.pdf 
(“However, the actual incidence of computer crime prosecutions is little more than 100  
per year.”).  
 83. For a brief overview of key issues involved in appropriately identifying computer 
hackers, see Daniel A. Morris, Tracking a Computer Hacker, 
http://www.cybercrime.gov/usamay2001_2.htm (last visited June 1, 2009). Perhaps the 
most significant technical addition to this list would be the trend toward cost-prohibition of 
investigations brought about by antiforensic tools. See Berinato, supra note 58 (noting that 
traditional physical investigative methods such as interrogations supplement shortfalls in 
computer-forensic data). 
84. See Susan W. Brenner & Joseph J. Schwerha IV, Transnational Evidence Gather-
ing and Local Prosecution of International Cybercrime, 20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 347, 354-66 (2002); see also John Dorschner, ‘Love Bug’ Hacker Case Dropped by 
Philippines; Nations Lack Laws for Prosecution, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 22, 2000, at 1A. 
Quickly after this, the Philippines passed a law making the activity (virus writing) a crime. Id. 
85. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Harmonizing Cybertort Law for Eu-
rope and America, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 13, 19-23 (2005). 
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these governments, many havens for cybercriminal activity exist.86
Even when jurisdiction presents no obstacle, evidentiary concerns 
further complicate prosecutorial efforts. Prosecutors may need to rely 
upon local authorities to gather evidence and logs that either may 
not exist, may be falsified, may be too cost-prohibitive to investigate, 
or may not be retained long enough for investigators to obtain them.87
 Contrast the low risk of detection with the sizable number of both 
potential exploits and unprotected computers. As of November 2007, 
the number of known computer threats detected for personal com-
puter platforms exceeded 340,000.88 During that same month, the 
United States Computer Emergency Response Team (US-CERT) 
listed over 174 high severity software vulnerabilities reported.89 Cer-
tainly not all vulnerabilities are discovered by way of zero-day ex-
ploits active in cyberspace, but some may be discovered in that man-
ner. Further, some vulnerabilities may be patched even before an ex-
ploit has been crafted and used. It is unclear what fraction of end us-
ers applies patches in time to counteract potential threats. 
 Given the variety of threats, it is perhaps no surprise that a sig-
nificant number of computers connected to the Internet have been 
compromised. A recent estimate at the 2007 World Economic Forum 
declared that approximately one quarter of the computers connected 
to the Internet have been compromised.90 A recent FBI investigation 
identified approximately one million infected computers in the Unit-
                                                                                                                    
86. See, e.g., Brenner, supra note 25, at 7-8; Dorschner, supra note 84. 
87. See, e.g., Berinato, supra note 58; Morris, supra note 83. 
 88. This number comes from the threat definition files of one popular antimalware 
software vendor, McAfee. McAfee Threat Center—DAT Readme Page, http://vil.nai.com/ 
vil/DATReadme.aspx (last visited June 1, 2009) (listing 344,503 threats detected by DAT 
Version 5163). However, this number is perhaps misleading since many of these likely 
represent minor variants upon common themes. See Computer Viruses Hit One Million,
BBC NEWS, Apr. 10, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7340315.stm (“The vast 
majority of [the 711,912 novel threats detected in 2007] are aimed at PCs running Micro-
soft Windows and are variants of already existing malicious programs that have proved 
useful to hi-tech criminals in the past.”). 
89. See US-CERT, Cyber Security Bulletin SB07-316 (2007), http://www.us-
cert.gov/cas/bulletins/SB07-316.html (Nov. 5, 2007) (forty-nine); US-CERT, Cyber Security 
Bulletin SB07-323 (2007), http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/bulletins/SB07-323.html (Nov. 12, 
2007) (forty-four); US-CERT, Cyber Security Bulletin SB07-330 (2007), http://www.us-
cert.gov/cas/bulletins/SB07-330.html (Nov. 19, 2007) (forty-three); US-CERT, Cyber Securi-
ty Bulletin SB07-337 (2007), http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/bulletins/SB07-337.html (Nov. 26, 
2007) (thirty-eight). The term “high severity” is explained in each bulletin with hyperlinks 
to supporting documentation. While many of these vulnerabilities may exist in software 
with only marginal market share, the bulletins illustrate the variety of opportunities 
available to malware authors. 
 90. Nate Anderson, Vint Cerf: One Quarter of All Computers Part of a Botnet, ARS
TECHNICA, Jan. 25, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070125-8707.html. The 
recent Downadup worm alone conservatively infected approximately one in sixteen per-
sonal computers. Gregg Keizer, Downadup Worm Now Infects 1 in Every 16 PCs, Says 
Panda Security, COMPUTERWORLD, Jan. 21, 2009, http://www.computerworld.com/action/ 
article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=9126482&source=toc. 
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ed States alone.91 The most significant botnets may even exceed 
200,000 computers at a given time.92 These numbers seem to indicate 
that in addition to the large number of infected computers, there is 
also a significant number of discrete botnets. While it is possible that 
separate botnets may be maintained by a smaller number of han-
dlers, it would seem that there is a large number of individual users 
infecting computers. Of particular concern is the recent innovation of 
botnets that are able to react decisively against security researchers 
that are deemed threats by subjecting the researchers to DDoS at-
tacks in response to probes of the botnet’s network.93
 Many of the threats that actively scan other computers rely upon 
targets that are both unpatched and unprotected by other traffic-
filtering technology. Experiments with servers configured to mimic 
unprotected computers (“honeypots”) have indicated that most ex-
ploitative traffic scours cyberspace using automated tools that check 
for common vulnerabilities.94 The dominance of “known vulnerabili-
ty” exploitative traffic appears consistent with the typical “life cycle” 
of an exploit, where widely available tools allow the least talented 
hackers to run automated attacks.95 The proliferation of more effec-
tive firewalls, notably free ones, can limit the spread of these com-
mon vulnerabilities.96 Still, operation of a firewall, while certainly 
advised, is not a prerequisite to connectivity—many computers, even 
those running reasonably advanced database applications, are not 
using firewalls.97
  Aside from cybercriminals, no single class of actors can be held 
accountable for the current cybersecurity crisis because the method 
and severity of potential exploits vary wildly. In some instances, the 
                                                                                                                    
 91. FBI Bot Roast, supra note 70. There is no indication from either the article or the 
linked press release that this was an exhaustive search or complete tally even at the time.
92. See Kelly Jackson Higgins, The World’s Biggest Botnets, DARK READING, Nov. 9, 
2007, http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=138610 (noting that the Storm-
worm botnet comprised of roughly 230,000 computers). 
93. See Tim Wilson, Researchers Fear Reprisals from Storm, DARK READING, Oct. 29, 
2007, http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=137584 (describing the Storm-
worm botnet’s use of DDoS attacks against detected security researchers). 
94. See Byron Acohido & Jon Swartz, Unprotected PCs Can Be Hijacked in Minutes,
USA TODAY, Nov. 30, 2004, at 3B. See generally Ian Walden & Anne Flanagan, Honeypots: 
A Sticky Legal Landscape?, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 317 (2003) (describing op-
eration of honeypots). 
95. See Pinkney, supra note 17, at 61; Ethan Preston & John Lofton, Computer Secu-
rity Publications: Information Economics, Shifting Liability and the First Amendment, 24 
WHITTIER L. REV. 71, 85-86 (2002). 
 96. The most obvious free firewall is that which is bundled with Windows XP (known 
either as Internet Connection Firewall or Windows Firewall depending upon the revision). 
Many others are commercially available for a variety of operating systems. 
 97. One recent survey extrapolated that nearly 500,000 Microsoft SQL and Oracle da-
tabase servers are “directly accessible” or “not protected by a firewall.” DAVID LITCHFIELD,
THE DATABASE EXPOSURE SURVEY 2007, at 2 (2007), http://regmedia.co.uk/2007/11/ 
15/thedatabaseexposuresurvey2007.pdf. 
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error is a trivial programming oversight. In others, even a reasonably 
cautious Web browser may be led astray by the addition of malicious 
code to an otherwise trustworthy Web site.98 Focusing attention on 
either the software developers or the end users alone is insufficient 
to address the full range of exploitative activity. The structure estab-
lished by the marketplace and legal system is decidedly reactive, 
with its only proactive slant being the deterrence caused by signifi-
cant punishments and laws which border on strict liability. However, 
there is another proactive element—those individuals who attempt to 
find vulnerabilities and eliminate them before their exploitation. 
C.   Enter the “(Off-)White Hats” 
 Contrasted with malicious hackers are those whose ultimate goal 
is to create a more secure Internet. The term “ethical hacking” may 
have meaning that varies with each individual, but at its core it in-
volves ethical principles that would prohibit taking advantage of a 
potential target’s lack of security.99 These principles embody the form 
of self-governance that best characterizes the Internet’s growth; indi-
viduals who subscribe to these principles dedicate their time and ef-
fort to dealing with online threats in ways that common “free rider” 
Web surfers are unwilling or unable to do. 
 Technically speaking, descriptors such as “ethical” or “black hat” 
are best applied to actions rather than individuals; it has become 
common to equate actions and the perpetrators of those actions on 
ideological grounds. This leads to stereotyping of a sort; the white 
hats are tirelessly collecting information on compromised computers 
or disclosing new exploits privately to security companies while the 
black hats are spamming, installing keyloggers, and stealing from re-
tirees’ life savings.100 While some white-hat activity involves data col-
                                                                                                                    
 98. While many computer users may be familiar with malware that pretends to be a 
legitimate security warning, new methods of delivery can still cause confusion. See, e.g.,
Betsy Schiffman, Hackers Use Banner Ads on Major Sites to Hijack Your PC, WIRED, Nov. 
15, 2007, http://www.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2007/11/doubleclick (describing banner 
ads on “various legitimate websites” that redirect browsers even without the end user 
clicking on the ads). 
 99. The term “ethical hacker” has even become a sort of brand for specialized comput-
er training. See, e.g., EC-Council, Certified Ethical Hacker, http://www.eccouncil.org/ 
CEH.htm (last visited June 1, 2009) (“Hacking is a felony in the United States and most 
other countries. When it is done by request and under a contract between an Ethical Hack-
er and an organization, it is legal. The most important point is that an Ethical Hacker has 
authorization to probe the target.”). This Comment prefers the broader depiction of a loose 
set of “minimal harm” principles. See also infra Part IV.C-E (arguing that private autho-
rized solutions do not affect enough computers). 
 100. Of course, in some cases the stereotypes are appropriate. See Brian Krebs, Bring-
ing Botnets out of the Shadows, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Mar. 21, 2006, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/21/AR2006032100279.html 
(describing the volunteer “Shadowserver” organization); see also Shadowserver Founda-
tion, Mission Page, http://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/pmwiki.php/Shadowserver/Mission 
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lection and incident response that coordinates well with established 
law enforcement, other activity is not necessarily as legally appropri-
ate. For example, activist hackers have engaged in denial-of-service 
attacks or Web site defacement for political reasons.101 Hackers have 
also been instrumental in identifying individuals trafficking child 
pornography online.102 These individuals can employ the same tools 
and techniques as malicious hackers.103
 Differentiating ethical from malicious hacking may seem to be dif-
ficult, particularly from the perspective of first-response server ad-
ministrators who first see that their system has been accessed. The 
same technology used to steal or break passwords, which may be 
used by criminals to steal a victim’s credit card, may be turned 
against those same criminals. Indeed, these tools are part of the es-
sential arsenal of an information technology specialist; testing one’s 
own system involves attempting to crack the system from the out-
side.104 Presumably what differentiates benign and malicious hacking 
lies in the set of ethics guiding each group. Recent empirical work 
supports that assertion, finding that individuals who specifically 
identify as either white-hat or black-hat have statistically significant 
differences on an ethical test.105 However, since some activities do not 
necessarily lend themselves to a binary classification, mixed terms 
such as “gray hat” have also been employed.106
                                                                                                                    
(last visited June 1, 2009) (describing itself as a volunteer group of security professionals 
whose mission is “to improve the security of the Internet by raising awareness of the pres-
ence of compromised servers, malicious attackers, and the spread of malware”). 
101. See, e.g., Byron Acohido, ‘Hacktivists’ Protest War by Attacking Web Sites, USA
TODAY, Mar. 26, 2003, at 1B. But see Michelle Delio, Hacktivism and How It Got Here,
WIRED, July 14, 2004, http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/news/2004/07/64193 (arguing that 
the term “hacktivism” was originally intended to apply to the “development and use of 
technology to foster human rights and the open exchange of information” and not political 
activism by hacking). 
102. See, e.g., Sharon Gaudin, Vigilante Hacker’s Evidence Puts Judge Behind Bars,
INFORMATIONWEEK, Feb. 23, 2007, http://www.informationweek.com/news/ 
showArticle.jhtml?articleID=197008431. 
103. See Nancy Gohring, Hacking for a Good Cause, INFO WORLD, Dec. 24, 2007, 
http://www.infoworld.com/article/07/12/24/Hacking-for-a-good-cause_1.html (describing a 
vigilante hacker’s use of trojan horse software). 
104. See Sommer, supra note 81, at 70 tbl.1 (listing typical system maintenance tools); 
see also id. at 68 (noting that “many hacking tools are indistinguishable from utilities that 
are essential for the maintenance and security of computers and networks”); Adler, supra
note 66 (demonstrating that denial of service can be accomplished through legitimate ac-
tivity as well as through a malicious attack). 
105. See Steube, supra note 22, at 115-16, 118-20. The study concluded that a predic-
tive model based on gender, level of certification, and ethical score could be used to predict 
membership. Id. at 115-16. In particular, self-described white-hat hackers as a whole had 
higher scores on the moral judgment test, indicating arguably more mature “moral compe-
tence.” Id. at 118-20. 
106. See What Is Gray Hat?, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/sDefinition/ 
0,,sid14_gci555449,00.html [hereinafter SearchSecurity, Gray Hat Definition] (differentiat-
ing white hats from gray hats in terms of whether or not a vulnerability is publicized) (last 
visited June 1, 2009). 
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 Many of these nuanced labels distinguish hackers’ methodology 
more than their intended goals. Some definitions would reserve the 
term “ethical” hacking for only those who act under authorization.107
Others choose to differentiate white hats from gray hats based on the 
extent of the hackers’ disclosure: individuals working privately with 
victims would constitute white hats while those who publicly an-
nounce vulnerabilities would comprise gray hats.108 Public disclosure 
in particular remains a thorny point. Although public disclosure may 
increase public consciousness of problems and thereby motivate com-
panies to employ better security measures,109 many commentators 
have noted the capacity for disclosures to damage the market’s confi-
dence in the target.110 Loss in public confidence is often cited as a 
significant reason why voluntary reporting of hacking incidents has 
been abysmally low in recent years.111 Given these constraints, it is 
perfectly reasonable for those who respond to hacking incidents to 
argue that even gray-hat hacking is criminal in nature.112
 To avoid confusion, this Comment avoids the “gray hat” distinc-
tion, instead focusing on the broader ethical dimension involved in 
hacking—does the hacker seek to improve security overall while mi-
nimizing damage to the target? Given the heavily reactive nature of 
cybersecurity and the significant foothold obtained by cybercriminals 
as a result of that approach, it is important to reassess the cost-
benefit scheme currently in place. Part III will explore the way in 
which the externalities produced by the current legal regime deters 
unauthorized hacking that would cause only trivial damage, discou-
raging the perhaps weighty beneficial effects. Current law reflects a 
draconian reading in which the threshold for unacceptable damage, 
irrespective of benefits, is set so low as to be almost nonexistent. 
Nevertheless, debate over the distinction between white- and gray-
hat hacking illustrates the tension between the law and hacker ethics.113
                                                                                                                    
 107. EC-Council, supra note 99. 
 108. SearchSecurity, Gray Hat Definition, supra note 106; see also Robert Lemos, New 
Laws Make Hacking a Black-and-White Choice, CNET NEWS, Sept. 23, 2002, 
http://www.news.com/2009-1001-958129.html (describing gray-hat hacking as entailing 
both unauthorized access and public disclosure). 
 109. See Preston & Lofton, supra note 95, at 88-94 (discussing benefits and drawbacks 
of both full-disclosure and limited-disclosure models, apparently focusing on technical vul-
nerabilities rather than site-specific hacking). 
 110. See Fred H. Cate, Information Security Breaches and the Threat to Consumers, 60 
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 344, 348 (2006); Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 34, at 306-07; 
Schwalb, supra note 32, at 170. 
 111. See, e.g., GAO CHALLENGES, supra note 70, at 36-38. 
 112. See Lemos, supra note 108 (quoting security consultant Peter Lindstrom, “If you 
are gray, you are black”). 
 113. See Andy Greenberg, Middle America, Meet the Hackers, FORBES.COM, Aug. 7, 
2007, http://www.forbes.com/home/technology/2007/08/06/security-hacking-challenge-tech-
cx_ag_0806toughhack.html (quoting an organizer of the DefCon security/hacking confe-
rence, who stated “[w]e simply don’t take the law as a moral compass”). 
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 This line between “ethical” and “unethical” behavior has blurred 
over time, as early “hacking” was often informed by certain ethical 
principles that would now seem dangerous in the wake of rampant 
cybercrime. This ethic focused on open access to technology and in-
formation, such as engaging in activities like “phreaking” to gain 
access to telephone networks without cost.114 In this sense, the hack-
er ethic historically emphasized access over proprietary interests.115
Without the wide connectivity of the Internet, early hacking groups 
were close-knit and often bonded by strong personalities and ethical 
identities.116 A typical theme was to avoid intentionally damaging 
target systems, which would seem to allow file alteration only to 
avoid detection.117 Enforcement of these norms occurred through 
common social pressures and the generally meritocratic nature of  
the groups.118
 The growth of cyberspace and the de-emphasis of geographic or 
national boundaries and geographically constrained networks may 
have disrupted this social balance.119 Individuals who did not fit with-
in the limited selection of local groups became exposed to a wider 
base from which to find others of similar sentiment.120 Similarly, the 
wider anonymity of the Internet offered the opportunity to reinvent 
oneself. Even though the Internet allowed for a wider emergence of 
malicious ethics, most hackers are still united by a fundamental ap-
preciation for the manipulation of technology and the common sub-
ject matter. The meritocratic impulses also seem intact; hackers of 
all color hats establish reputations through successful exploits in a 
                                                                                                                    
 114. Computer hacking and phone phreaking involve different but related skills, 
though the prevalence of individuals who did both, as well as common use of the terms by 
laymen, blurred the distinction. See Lee et al., supra note 56, at 857-58; Gordon R. Meyer, 
The Social Organization of the Computer Underground 17-30 (Aug. 1989) (unpublished 
M.A. Thesis, Northern Illinois University, available at http://www.windowsecurity.com/ 
uplarticle/16/gordon.txt). 
 115. See Lee et al., supra note 56, at 865; cf. Delio, supra note 101 (definition of “hack-
tivism” as defined by hacking group Cult of the Dead Cow). 
 116. See Brent Wible, Note, A Site Where Hackers Are Welcome: Using Hack-in Con-
tests to Shape Preferences and Deter Computer Crime, 112 YALE L.J. 1577, 1590 (2003).  
 117. See Lee et al., supra note 56, at 866; see also Steven Mizrach, Is There a Hacker 
Ethic for 90s Hackers?, http://www.fiu.edu/~mizrachs/hackethic.html (last visited June 1, 
2009) (“Of course, the key problem with this ethical position is its stance on intent. One 
should not damage data deliberately. But what if, as often happens in hacking attempts, 
one accidentally erases or alters data while trying to alter system log files or user records? 
Is that an ethical violation? Also, the question of what constitutes ‘harm’ is left open.”). 
 118. See Lee et al., supra note 56, at 866-67. See generally Meyer, supra note 114, at 
39-74 (discussing nature of interaction amongst members of computer underground, both 
binding and dividing forces). 
 119. See Lee et al., supra note 56, at 867 (quoting Benjamin J. Fox, Hackers and the 
U.S. Secret Service, UCLA ONLINE INST. FOR CYBERSPACE L. & POL’Y (1997), 
http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/iclp/bfox.html (last visited June 1, 2009)). For a historical pers-
pective on the evolution of hacker ethics, see Ryan, supra note 6, at 40-51. 
 120. See Lee et al., supra note 56, at 867-68 (discussing lack of “self-selecting mechan-
isms” common to original BBS-based hacking groups). 
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common subculture.121 Sponsored hacking contests have provided op-
portunities to channel these energies in culturally acceptable ways; 
other activities vary by the individual’s ethical impulses and person-
al motivations.122
 Some remnants of the original hacker ethic remain, however, as 
participation in hacking contests demonstrate. The rise of the mali-
cious hacker ethos appears to have provoked a direct response by the 
descendants of the original hacker ethos. These individuals and 
groups seek to confront the threat to cyberspace and the inadequacy 
of traditional market and governmental forces through the self-
governance that has typified the development of cyberspace.123 Nu-
merous examples demonstrate cooperation between groups of hack-
ers and law enforcement personnel. Volunteer groups exist to main-
tain spam blacklists,124 monitor botnets,125 and combat child porno-
graphy trafficking,126 among other activities. While the development 
of security consultants and ethical hacker certifications provide mar-
ket solutions to firms and individuals capable of affording the servic-
es,127 significant volunteer efforts have been arrayed against existing 
cyberspace dangers.  
 Unfortunately, these cyber “white knights” face significant legal 
constraints. While some hacking activities are unacceptable vigilant-
ism that should be deterred, more flexibility is essential to achieve 
sustainable self-governance against malicious hackers. While the 
thrill-seeking and authority-challenging members of the hacking 
community might choose to ignore these risks, the chilling effect of 
these laws is real. Current laws arguably reflect a near strict liability 
standard that stands at odds with traditional hacking principles such 
as exploration and innovation. In the absence of an effective punitive 
response, these laws underdeter the malicious hackers while overde-
                                                                                                                    
 121. See Skibell, supra note 11, at 919-20 (discussing the common motivation to con-
quer challenges and to boast); Wible, supra note 116, at 1591-92 (discussing universal 
hacker attendance at notable conventions such as Black Hat and DEFCON). 
 122. See Wible, supra note 116, at 1593-94 (discussing prevalence and popularity of 
hacking contests). See generally Rustad, supra note 18, at 67-86 (applying Robert Merton’s 
theory of deviant behavior to explain behavior of Web citizens, including nonutilitarian 
hacking, which falls outside this theory).  
 123. Some have even argued that the most talented hackers are the ones most likely to 
be concerned with ethical issues. See Skibell, supra note 11, at 920 (citing work and testi-
mony of Paul A. Taylor and Douglas Thomas). 
 124. See David E. Sorkin, Technical and Legal Approaches to Unsolicited Electronic 
Mail, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 325, 347-49 (2001) (discussing general principles of blacklists and 
naming some notable lists). 
 125. See Krebs, supra note 100 (discussing example of Shadowserver Foundation). 
 126. See Deborah Radcliff, Vigilante Group Targets Child-Porn Sites, CNN.COM, Jan. 
11, 2000, http://archives.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/01/11/condemned.org.idg/index.html. 
 127. E.g., supra note 99. While solving many problems for clients, even these services 
have limitations. For example, a small percentage of secure computers may still be over-
whelmed by traffic from a larger population of unsecure computers. See infra Part IV.C-E. 
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terring the prosocial hackers who cannot balance the risk of punish-
ment with any pecuniary gain of their own. 
III.   LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS TO ETHICAL HACKING
A.   Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
 The lynchpin of federal cybercrime legislation is the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030. First 
enacted in 1984,128 Congress has amended this section ten times with 
significant expansions from its original text.129 The Act criminalizes 
unauthorized access to computer systems in many forms. It includes 
a number of provisions that protect the following: certain critical in-
formation from unauthorized disclosure;130 other classes of informa-
tion such as financial or federal records;131 access to federal  
governmental computers;132 and information obtained with intent  
to defraud.133
 Rather than focus on the nature of the target, a broader subsec-
tion acts as the section’s effective “antihacking” provision.134 Rather 
than determining the information that could be compromised by a 
hacker, this subsection focuses on damage caused to target comput-
ers (and related devices).135 Under this subsection, the term “pro-
tected computer” is broadly defined as one “used in or affecting inter-
state or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer 
                                                                                                                    
 128. Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-473, § 2102(a), 98 Stat. 2190 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (2009)).  
 129. Id., amended by Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, § 2, 
100 Stat. 1213 (1986); amended by Minor and Technical Criminal Law Amendments Act of 
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7065, 102 Stat. 4404 (1988); amended by Financial Institu-
tions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 962(a)(5), 103 
Stat. 502 (1989); amended by Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, §§ 1205(e), 
2597(j), 3533, 104 Stat. 4831, 4910, 4925 (1990); amended by Computer Abuse Amend-
ments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 290001(b)-(f), 108 Stat. 2097 (1994); amended by
National Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, §§ 201, 
604(b)(36), 110 Stat. 3491, 3508 (1996); amended by Uniting and Strengthening America 
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA 
PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001 , Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 506(a), 814, 115 Stat. 366, 382 (2001); 
amended by Criminal Law Technical Amendments Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, §§ 
4002(b)(1), (12), 4005(a)(3), (d)(3), 116 Stat. 1807, 1808, 1812, 1813 (2002); amended by Cy-
ber Security Enhancement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 225(g), 116 Stat. 2158 
(2002); amended by Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-326, §§ 203-08, 122 Stat. 3560, 3560-65 (2008). The most recent revision also greatly 
expands the “cyber extortion” provisions, criminalizes conspiracy to commit cybercrime, 
and adds a provision for forfeiture. See Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act §§ 
205, 206, 208. 
 130. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(1) (2009). 
 131. Id. § 1030(a)(2).  
 132. Id. § 1030(a)(3). 
 133. Id. § 1030(a)(4). 
 134. Id. § 1030(a)(5). 
 135. See id. (referring in each subsection to damage to a “protected computer”).  
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located outside the United States that is used in a manner that af-
fects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United 
States.”136 Given the intrinsic connection of the Internet to commerce 
and communication, this clearly establishes cyberspace-wide jurisdic-
tion.137 Within this subsection, there are three increasingly broad 
modes of causing damage and five categories of damage that  
trigger liability. 
 The third and broadest mode of causing damage merely requires 
intentional access of a protected computer.138 There is no state-of-
mind required in causing damage, contrasted with the second mode, 
which requires that the defendant act recklessly in causing damage 
to the protected computer.139 These “reckless damage” and “mere in-
tentional access” modes yield different maximum terms of imprison-
ment, and the CFAA provides for differentially harsher penalties for 
multiple convictions.140 Due in part to its reduced mens rea require-
ments, the “mere intentional access” mode of causing damage pro-
vides the greatest opportunity for criticism.141
 Before Congress enacted this antihacking provision of the CFAA, 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Morris,142
addressed a similar situation in which intentional access was pu-
nished irrespective of the intent to cause damage. The prosecutors 
pursued the individual responsible for the infamous Morris worm, 
whose buggy replication code overwhelmed and shut down many 
computers.143 Morris released the worm through university comput-
ers in such a way as to hide the intrusion, and the worm exploited 
                                                                                                                    
 136. Id. § 1030(e)(2)(B). The “or affecting” language was added in the recent amend-
ments. See Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-326, § 
207, 122 Stat. 3560 (2008). 
 137. Even before the recent amendments, courts seemingly had little difficulty with 
this argument. See United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 244 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[B]ecause 
of the very interstate nature of the Internet, once a user submits a connection request to a 
website server or an image is transmitted from the website server back to the user, the da-
ta has traveled in interstate commerce.” (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Lew-
is, No. 07-1462, 2009 WL 225255, at *6 (1st Cir. Feb. 2, 2009); United States v. Runyan, 
290 F.3d 223, 239 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Carroll, 105 F.3d 740, 742 (1st  
Cir. 1997). 
 138. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(5)(C).  
 139. Compare id. § 1030(a)(5)(B), with id. § 1030(a)(5)(C). The first mode of causing 
damage is significantly different; it has two state-of-mind requirements that require both 
knowingly transmitting a program, command, or data and intentionally causing damage 
without authorization. Id. § 1030(a)(5)(A). 
 140. See id. § 1030(c)(4)(A), (C), (D), (G).  
 141. See infra notes 152-86 and accompanying text. 
 142. 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 143. Id. at 505-06; see also ZITTRAIN, supra note 16, at 37-40; Memorandum from J. 
Reynolds, IETF Network Working Group, RFC 1135, on the Helminthiasis of the Internet 
(Dec. 1989), http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1135. This RFC (Request for Comment) analyzes 
the worm’s aftermath, both technically and politically, providing a unique perspective on 
the self-governance of the Internet in the wake of an Internet catastrophe. 
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software vulnerabilities, excessive trust between computers, and eas-
ily guessed passwords.144 The government brought charges under a 
precursor to § 1030(a)(3),145 which was the access to federal comput-
ers provision causing damage of $1000 or more.146 Morris argued that 
because the government did not demonstrate that he intended to im-
pair the functions of the computers, he bore no liability.147 The nar-
row question of statutory interpretation hinged on whether the in-
tent written in the statute applied both to access and damage ele-
ments despite the fact that the word appeared in the access clause 
alone.148 The Court disagreed after closely examining the legislative 
history of the “federal computer access” provision—specifically, a 
dual scienter requirement that existed in the 1984 version of the Act 
which was removed by the 1986 amendments while other mode-of-
access provisions retained their dual scienter requirements.149 Morris 
mounted a further challenge based upon an isolated section of legis-
lative history, but that was similarly rejected.150 The Ninth Circuit 
later rejected the argument that a lack of mens rea applied to the 
damages element rendered the statute unconstitutional while simul-
taneously adopting the Morris court’s statutory analysis.151
 A similar legislative intent can be found in the creation of the no-
scienter damage provision, currently codified as subsection (a)(5)(C). 
The addition of this damage mode without a mens rea requirement 
occurred during the 1996 amendments, which also closed a number 
of loopholes that had been inadvertently created in 1994.152 Since the 
reckless damage provision already existed at the time of the addi-
tions, there is little need to finely parse legislative history or con-
gressional reports as was done in Morris.
 Commentators have criticized the lack of a scienter requirement 
attached to damage caused to the protected computer. They complain 
that the absence of scienter overcriminalizes hacking activity that 
involves mere access and inadvertent minor damage, a result that is 
incompatible with the moral branding of criminal punishment.153 One 
approach argues that the sort of “malicious” hacker that is the myth-
                                                                                                                    
 144. See Morris, 928 F.2d at 506 (explaining the methods of breaking into computers 
and spreading in better detail). 
 145. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (1988). 
 146. Morris, 928 F.2d at 506.
 147. See id. at 507. 
 148. Id.
 149. Id. at 507-09. 
 150. United States v. Sablan, 92 F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Morris, 928 F.2d 504).  
 151. Id. at 868-69. 
 152. See Nicholson et al., supra note 82, at 215-16. 
 153. See Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributiv-
ism and the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157, 
2207-08 (2001) (noting the importance of a calibration between the social cost of a crime 
and the severity of its punishment). 
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ic target of CFAA legislation is far removed from the class of curious 
“look-and-see” hackers that may be convicted under such a low bar.154
Another argues that this overbroad reach effectively isolates an ethi-
cal hacking community that would otherwise both reinforce positive 
norms within the hacking community and provide the benefits of in-
creased cooperation between ethical hackers and law enforcement.155
However, the CFAA’s design has apparently intended that the mini-
mum damages bar would distinguish between typical “prankster” 
behavior and legitimate social harms.156 A sufficiently low damage 
threshold in computer trespass cases could make even inadvertent 
damage appear morally culpable. Unfortunately, the development of 
the damage provisions has only contributed to the CFAA’s perverse 
connection between punishment and moral culpability.
 Previously, § 1030 required that damage to a protected computer 
fall within one of five categories. Four categories included damage to 
medical care equipment,157 physical injury to any person,158 threats to 
public health or safety,159 or damage to computers “used by or for a 
government entity in furtherance of the administration of justice, na-
tional defense, or national security.”160 The fifth and most significant 
category (listed first in the statute) involved “loss to [one] or more 
persons during any [one]-year period” which aggregate to at least 
$5000.161 When investigated or charged criminally by the federal gov-
ernment, the loss could also stem from a “related course of conduct 
affecting [one] or more other protected computers.”162
                                                                                                                    
 154. See Skibell, supra note 11, at 921 (arguing that “the legal distinction between be-
nign trespass and harmful cracking has been virtually written out of the Act”). 
 155. See Lee et al., supra note 56, at 883-85. 
 156. See Skibell, supra note 11, at 921 (asserting that “there is a severe mismatch be-
tween the mythical computer criminal targeted by the increasingly-strict CFAA changes 
and actual perpetrators who are at risk of prosecution under the Act”); cf. George Roach & 
William J. Michiels, Damages Is the Gatekeeper Issue for Federal Computer Fraud, 8 TUL.
J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 61, 73 (2006) (“The statute’s goal of protecting privacy can be 
outweighed by a competing congressional concern that the application of the statute must 
not ignore the essential difference between prank and crime or trespass and sabotage. 
Thus, a statutory minimum was established . . . .”). 
 157. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2006).  
 158. Id. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(iii). 
 159. Id. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(iv). 
 160. Id. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(v). It is unclear how broadly this provision may be interpreted 
if, for example, the damage was done to a computer running a distributed computing pro-
gram. Typical distributed computing projects such as SETI@home use volunteer computers 
to perform modular computational functions in furtherance of a central project. See, e.g.,
Leon Erlanger, Distributed Computing: An Introduction, EXTREMETECH, Apr. 4, 2002, 
http://www.extremetech.com/article2/0,1697,11769,00.asp. It is not difficult to imagine a 
project that could meet a goal “in furtherance of the administration of justice, national de-
fense, or national security” specified under this provision. Id. 
 161. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(i). 
 162. Id. 
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 The ability to aggregate offenses allows a series of trivial discrete 
losses to aggregate into one criminal felony. Commentators have 
noted that while this permits a greater proportion of computer of-
fenses to be charged, it does so at the expense of disconnecting the 
punishment from our intuitions of moral culpability, particularly 
when combined with the inadvertent damage offense.163 While a se-
ries of discrete losses might seem like a reasonable subject of legisla-
tion to prevent patterns of abuse, the ability to execute a large num-
ber of identical actions with a simple script can easily fall into this 
aggregation trap.164 This seriously inhibits the CFAA’s potential to 
distinguish between pranks and traditional social harms. 
 This framework has recently been moved from the subsection de-
fining offenses to the subsection defining damages, and it no longer 
applies to the “mere intentional access” mode of causing damage.165
The amendments appear to have compensated somewhat by adding 
the phrase “and loss” to the “mere intentional access” mode; however, 
there no longer appears to be a minimum-loss threshold such as that 
which existed under the old framework.166 A lack of threshold is espe-
cially disconcerting considering the unique definition of loss applied 
to offenses charged under the CFAA. The definition of “loss” in the 
CFAA is 
any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding 
to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the 
data, program, system, or information to its condition prior to the 
offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential 
damages incurred because of interruption of service.167
A similar but slightly expanded definition appears within the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual.168 This definition is notable in that 
offenses charged under the CFAA are the only offenses labeled under 
                                                                                                                    
 163. See, e.g., Skibell, supra note 11, at 927. 
 164. See Roach & Michiels, supra note 156, at 68-70 (discussing aggregation’s legisla-
tive history and possibly unintuitive hypotheticals triggering liability); Granick et al., su-
pra note 82, at 7 (discussing how common business practice becomes suspect under aggre-
gation because of repetition of the same minor violation). 
 165. Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-326, § 
204, 122 Stat. 3560, 3561-62 (2008) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)-(B)). 
 166. Id. (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(5)(C)). 
 167. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(11) (2009). The definition for “damage” is similarly expan-
sive, consisting of “any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a 
system, or information.” Id. § 1030(e)(8). 
 168. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. 3(A)(v)(III) (2007) 
(“In the case of an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1030, actual loss includes the following pecu-
niary harm, regardless of whether such pecuniary harm was reasonably foreseeable: any 
reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a 
damage assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or information to its condi-
tion prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other damages incurred be-
cause of interruption of service.”).  
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“fraud” whose definition of loss extends beyond reasonably foreseea-
ble losses.169
 The Sentencing Guidelines Manual definition has often been in-
terpreted as codifying—and in fact extending—the approach taken 
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Middle-
ton.170 In Middleton, an ex-employee used a variety of means to re-
gain access to the computer system of his employer and subsequently 
used the access to wreak havoc.171 The company was forced to repair 
deleted software and databases and resecure access to numerous 
employees, costing at least 150 hours of specified lost productivity.172
After dispensing with the argument that the term “individual” in the 
CFAA excluded corporations,173 the Ninth Circuit addressed the 
proper measure of damages.174 The court upheld the trial court’s jury 
instruction, which specified that all reasonably foreseeable costs in 
resecuring the system could be considered.175 Using the hourly wages 
of employees who participated in the restoration effort, the damages 
easily exceeded the statutory minimum.176 Since Middleton, the loss 
rules applied have become even more inclusive.177
 The “any reasonable cost” approach has been criticized because it 
is a victim-centric loss rule, which has both economic and theoretical 
implications.178 The current loss definition may allow any reasonable 
cost, including response costs, damage assessments, restoration 
costs, lost revenue, incurred costs, or interruption of service costs, to 
aggregate to reach the statutory minimum.179 This measure is heavi-
ly dependent upon the victim’s response, and given such broad cate-
gories of reasonable costs, the current “damage and loss” require-
ment serves no culpability-sorting function.  
                                                                                                                    
 169. Compare id. (CFAA offenses), with id. § 2B1.1 cmt. 3(A)(i)-(iv) (2007) (general 
fraud loss rule). 
 170. 231 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2000). But see Roach & Michiels, supra note 156, at 71 
(arguing that no legislative history indicates that the USA PATRIOT ACT specifically codi-
fied the Middleton approach). 
 171. Middleton, 231 F.3d at 1208-09. 
 172. Id. at 1209. 
 173. Id. at 1210-13. 
 174. Id. at 1213. 
 175. Id.
 176. Id. at 1213-14. 
 177. Compare id. at 1213, with U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 168, § 2B1.1 cmt. 
3(A)(v)(III) (“[A]ctual loss includes [later enumerated] pecuniary harm, regardless of 
whether such pecuniary harm was reasonably foreseeable . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 178. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Granick, Faking It: Calculating Loss in Computer Crime Sen-
tencing, 2 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 207 (2006).
 179. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11) (2006). Note that while “investigation” activities are not 
covered, the line between investigation and the statutory categories of allowed loss is blur-
ry at best, and courts are not incentivized to finely parse the distinction. See Granick, su-
pra note 178, at 218-24. A wide variety of activities have been included in loss calculations. 
See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 477 F.3d 215, 224 (5th Cir. 2007) (costs to contact indi-
viduals whose identifying information was stolen). 
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 These standards similarly devalued the CFAA’s prior $5000 statu-
tory minimum,180 though its victim-centric nature risked a capricious 
sorting function. The loss definition arguably encouraged inefficient 
victim response when excessive response costs both allow the intru-
sion to reach the statutory loss threshold and lead to the prospect of 
civil recovery or tax write-offs. The ability to assert intangible harms 
also provided incentives for victims to inflate or manipulate their as-
serted losses.181 An intrusion could become a triggering point to per-
form an otherwise necessary or overdue audit or corrective action, 
which allows planned expenses to opportunistically become damages 
to the detriment of the defendant.182 Some have even argued that re-
securing costs were overemphasized in damage calculations, particu-
larly in light of the otherwise natural need to secure one’s own com-
puter systems.183
 A greater conceptual difficulty stems from punishment under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which is tied to the amount of loss 
defined broadly with respect to the victim’s remedial efforts. Thus, 
punishment no longer solely tracks the moral culpability of the per-
petrator’s actions but also tracks the victim’s response.184 An example 
illustrates the point.185 Imagine two teenage hackers who each access 
their school’s computer system and corrupt a grading database. The 
first hacker does so with the malicious intent of changing grades in 
the school’s database, but the school system responds by simply res-
toring a daily archive which takes minimal time. The second hacker 
causes damage inadvertently without even attempting to access the 
database. In this instance, lacking an adequate backup, the school 
system responds by hiring an outside consultant to review the attack 
and conduct an audit to ensure no other systems were compromised 
and that no malware was left behind, with a price tag well above the 
$5000 minimum. The first student, a “cracker,” could not be prose-
cuted despite malicious intent, while the second hacker could be con-
victed of a felony. While it may be argued that the potential uncer-
tainty of any unauthorized access justifies using the victim’s re-
                                                                                                                    
 180. See Granick et al., supra note 82, at 11. 
 181. See Skibell, supra note 11, at 932-33 (noting victims’ inability to fully quantify 
losses and motivations to inflate damage assessments); Granick et al., supra note 82, at 11-
12 (discussing various valuation problems, including the case United States v. Mitnick,
where a reported loss in millions of dollars curiously did not translate into a loss in any 
victim’s SEC filings). 
 182. See Creative Computing v. Getloaded.com LLC, 386 F.3d 930, 935-36 (9th Cir. 
2004) (rejecting argument that claimed damages included routine maintenance, specifical-
ly the patch that would have prevented the alleged hack). 
 183. See Skibell, supra note 11, at 928-31; Immunizing the Internet, supra note 20, at 
2453-54. 
 184. See, e.g., Granick, supra note 178, at 227-29. 
 185. My example is based upon Professor Granick’s hypothetical. See Granick et al., 
supra note 82, at 11.  
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sponse as a guide to harm sustained by the victim, that would seem 
to require a more detailed parsing of response activities. 
 Given the numerous hidden dangers that sophisticated hackers 
can employ,186 it may in fact be unreasonable not to engage in the 
sort of corrective activities, like the second school system above, that 
could trigger liability. No one knows merely from the compromise of 
a computer what may have been left behind by the attacker, and a 
thorough sweep might always be reasonable under those circums-
tances. At that point, the statutory minimum ceases to be relevant in 
sorting offenses by culpability. Under the approach taken by the 
CFAA, it is not clear that any fixed statutory minimum could salvage 
the sorting function. Nor has any concrete and effective suggestion 
for parsing these costs been advanced to date. Considering that even 
this minimal bar has been removed from the “mere intentional 
access” offense, the CFAA now relies solely on prosecutorial discre-
tion to distinguish legitimate social harms from prankster behavior. 
 In addition to the broad criminal liability, the CFAA also allows 
civil suits for recovery for compensatory damages or equitable re-
lief.187 Civil liability does not attach to mere access violations, but in-
stead requires that one of the above five categories of damage be 
met.188 Losses sustained with respect to the $5000 statutory mini-
mum are limited to economic losses.189 Because many hackers may be 
judgment-proof,190 this provision is presumably best applicable to 
economic damage done to businesses. However, given the lighter 
burden compared to a criminal charge, even a settlement-focused lit-
igation strategy provides another profound deterrent to unauthorized 
access for possible ethical hackers. 
 While there are also a number of related laws that serve to ex-
pand the arsenal of charges that may be brought against hackers, 
none of them are as broad as the antihacking provisions in the 
CFAA.191 By combining a standard which requires no scienter with 
respect to damages and coupling that standard with a definition of 
loss which has the potential to criminalize virtually any unautho-
                                                                                                                    
 186. See, e.g., Berinato, supra note 58. From leaving behind accounts or other back 
doors to the confusion spread by antiforensic techniques, the potential secondary effects of 
any intrusion are bound to cause legitimate uncertainty. 
 187. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2000). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See Lee et al., supra note 56, at 875 (citing Victoria A. Cundiff, Trade Secrets and 
the Internet: A Practical Perspective, COMPUTER LAW., Aug. 1997, at 6).  
 191. An exhaustive list is unnecessary, but some of the more significant ones include 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-05 (2000); National Stolen Prop-
erty Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2000); Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2510-21, 2701-10 (2000), which includes the Stored Communications Act; and various  
copyright and mail/wire fraud statutes. See generally, e.g., Nicholson et al., supra note 82, 
at 220-31. 
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rized access, the CFAA effectively establishes strict liability beyond 
the intentional access. Since the intent to access may be satisfied by 
virtually any programmatic function, the net effect is the potential to 
criminalize any hacking activity regardless of moral culpability.192
While the case has been made for the loss of privacy attendant with 
access to be a sufficient social harm, this seems to be a shadow of the 
CFAA’s original legislative targets.193 Considering the low capture 
rate of cybercriminals,194 the deterrent effects of such minimal stan-
dards are most significant to those who cannot balance the risk of 
hacking with any potential reward aside from psychic benefits. It is 
unclear whether this predominantly serves to channel ethical hack-
ers to reactive measures or to deter specific beneficial hacking activi-
ties. In the absence of significant evidence of crime prevention, the 
overbreadth of this standard appears difficult to justify.  
B.   A Strict(er) Liability Trend? 
 For those who argue that the CFAA reflects an approach too close 
to strict liability, recent activities by the Council of Europe will give 
even greater pause. The activities concern the criminalization of 
“hacking tools,” and there is significant ambiguity both in the defini-
tion of the term and scope of the criminalization. Applied in an ideal 
manner, the laws would inhibit the production and transfer of the in-
creasingly common tools that allow even the moderately unskilled to 
break into a vulnerable computer system. Even while nations are 
passing implementing legislation,195 the question remains how one ef-
fectively separates legitimate from illegitimate activity. And in the 
absence of being able to do so, such laws may serve as blanket prohi-
bitions that stifle valuable security goals.
 The Council of Europe drafted a treaty to standardize cybercrime 
legislation on November 23, 2001.196 The United States was a signa-
tory and subsequently ratified the treaty in 2006.197 By standardizing 
                                                                                                                    
 192. The phrase “virtually any programmatic function” at least implies those functions 
written or knowingly executed by the end user. Certainly some forms of access would be 
excluded, such as the access established by malware or other hidden, but memory-resident 
software—unwitting participation as a compromised computer in a botnet would not satis-
fy this intent. However, the Morris case demonstrates that the access of other computers 
even through random IP addresses, when causally linked to the software author, satisfies 
an intentional access prong. United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 193. See Skibell, supra note 11, at 921 (asserting that “there is a severe mismatch be-
tween the mythical computer criminal targeted by the increasingly-strict CFAA changes 
and actual perpetrators who are at risk of prosecution under the Act”). 
 194. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text. 
 195. See, e.g., Police and Justice Act, 2006, c. 48, § 37 (Eng.). 
 196. Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime (2001), ETS No. 185 [hereinafter 
CoE Cybercrime Convention], available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/ 
Html/185.htm (last visited June 1, 2009). 
 197. U.S. Dep’t Justice, International Aspects of Computer Crime, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/intl.html (last visited June 1, 2009). 
2009]            TECHNOLOGICAL NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH 569 
cybercrime legislation, countries may avoid some of the “safe haven” 
barriers to investigations among fellow parties.198 In the absence of 
direct control over cyberspace itself, harmonizing legal approaches is 
the best manner in which a country can ensure that its vision of cy-
bercrime jurisprudence is applicable beyond its borders. The Conven-
tion covers a broad range of topics, but the provision regarding “hack-
ing tools” raises significant questions as party states begin to imple-
ment enabling legislation. 
 Article Six of the Convention requires parties to adopt legislation 
which criminalizes the “production, sale, procurement for use, im-
port, distribution or otherwise making available of” two distinct cate-
gories.199 The first category is the “hacking tools” provision, which en-
compasses “a device, including a computer program, designed or 
adapted primarily for the purpose of” committing specified offenses 
which include illegal access, illegal interception, data interference, 
and system interference.200
 Many commentators have noted that most software can be consi-
dered dual-use—there are both legitimate and illegitimate uses for 
any tool.201 For example, a “dictionary attack” tool, which attempts to 
guess passwords by trying every item on a list, can be employed by a 
hacker to “guess” an account’s password.202 Similarly, system admin-
istrators may use those tools to audit the passwords of users and en-
sure that a hacker cannot guess those passwords. Put simply, any 
system administrator could employ many pieces of software em-
ployed by hackers to test whether the system can withstand the at-
tack.203 Perhaps specific malware management tools might be ex-
cluded from the list, as the code necessary for security work need not 
                                                                                                                    
 198. Cf. Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 34, at 345-46 (discussing the implementa-
tion issues involved in a global malware ban). 
 199. CoE Cybercrime Convention, supra note 196, art. 6, para. 1.a. 
 200. Id. art. 6, para. 1.a.i. 
 201. See generally Sommer, supra note 81.  
 202. Dictionary attacks conceptually require a pre-fabricated list (dictionary) and a tool 
which iterates through each entry either blindly or weighted by likelihood. See, e.g., Webo-
pedia.com, What Is a Dictionary Attack?, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/D/ 
dictionary_attack.html (last visited June 1, 2009). General public awareness about the 
“strength” of passwords has likely increased in recent years, with a variety of explanations 
and tools available online. See, e.g., Microsoft.com, Password Checker, 
http://www.microsoft.com/protect/yourself/password/checker.mspx (last visited June 1, 
2009) (online password-strength tool); Microsoft.com, Strong Passwords: How to Create 
and Use Them, http://www.microsoft.com/protect/yourself/password/create.mspx (last vi-
sited June 1, 2009). As a result, attacks might expand upon the finite “dictionary” to en-
compass any combination of alphanumeric characters. See, e.g., Imperva.com, Brute Force 
Attack, http://www.imperva.com/resources/glossary/brute_force.html (last visited June 1, 
2009); see also RAYMOND, supra note 21, at 91-92 (defining “brute force” with respect  
to programming).
 203. Sommer, supra note 81, at 70 tbl.1 (detailing classes of tools and both legitimate 
and illegitimate uses). 
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require full-fledged malware functionality.204 The phrase “designed or 
adapted primarily” does not seem to make a particular distinction 
based on use; if the term “adapted” makes no distinction based on the 
circumstances of use, it seems at odds with the fairly robust list of 
activities that trigger liability.  
 Under this broad reading, it would appear to prohibit system ad-
ministrators from possessing the tools to properly test their installa-
tions. It would also appear to make even contractual penetration 
testing impossible by parties situated within a party nation’s bor-
ders, as whatever distinction may be made between legal and illegal 
access seems swallowed up by the emphasis on design and adapta-
tion. This could also serve to chill legitimate security research, as the 
development of vulnerabilities, including the design of proof-of-
concept exploit code, may also run afoul of even a generous distinc-
tion.205 Hosting of information regarding vulnerabilities could be  
interpreted as supporting criminals, whether that was the intention 
or not. 
 Many of these concerns are addressed by the second paragraph of 
Article Six, which indicates that it should not be interpreted as cri-
minalizing these tools unless there is intent to actually commit an of-
fense using the tools.206 This paragraph specifically lists “authorised 
testing or protection of a computer system” as examples of nonin-
fringing use.207 Adding this specific intent provision appears to place 
the criminalization in the realm of inchoate offenses, providing both 
an additional charge and a foothold by which law enforcement may 
prevent crimes. What remains are the vagaries associated with dis-
tribution and publication. If one publishes a tool or proof-of-concept 
code and knows that it can or may be used by hackers, at what point 
is intent inferred by way of “willful blindness”?208 How easily need 
code be modified, or what specific pieces of functionality are more or 
less likely to trigger liability? 
 The first laws implementing the Convention are being passed at 
present, so there is no case law interpreting the enabling legisla-
tion.209 Legislators have passed these laws over objections of vague-
                                                                                                                    
 204. Mr. Sommer lists five tools that could not easily be classified as dual-use, at least 
under a “primarily” standard, including “virus creation kits,” “phishing kits,” “DDOS kits,” 
“email bombers,” and “Botnet management tools.” Id. at 69. 
 205. See Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 34, at 345-46. 
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ness,210 and it remains to be seen whether simple prosecutorial dis-
cretion will limit abusive expansion of the crime. If implemented as a 
charge secondary to an actual hacking offense, these laws may serve 
as little more than inchoate offenses or redundant sentence en-
hancements. However, to serve the obvious goal of disrupting hack-
ing tool distribution networks, the laws would need to be applied 
prior to the hacking attempt at the point of distribution, which may 
make demonstration of intent problematic. The question remains 
how to strike the appropriate balance between impact and culpabili-
ty. Perhaps most significantly, these laws serve as a clear example of 
the potential deterrence of ethical hacking; some high-profile security 
projects have either moved or been abandoned completely rather 
than risk running afoul of the law.211 At the least, unless the law 
treats ethical hacking as “protection of a computer system” under Ar-
ticle Six, which seems unlikely given current legal doctrine, the Con-
vention adds another tool by which to dissuade ethical hacking. 
IV.   NEW APPROACHES
 A number of solutions have been proposed to address the lingering 
problems of cybercrime and malicious hacking. Some of these solu-
tions have been presented in theoretical terms, focusing on specific 
problems and the actors best positioned to deal with those prob-
lems.212 Cybercrime has a broad reach, however, encompassing a va-
riety of methods and targets that allows criminals to stay a step 
ahead of reactive countermeasures. For instance, attaching liability 
to software manufacturers alone will not address the “botnet” prob-
lem if end users voluntarily download malware that infects their 
computers.213 In an attempt to craft an implementable solution, ele-
ments of various proposals can be mixed with different goals in mind.  
 One of the virtues of a solution that focuses on ethical hackers is 
the obvious parity with the malicious hackers. The methods and tools 
employed are identical, and as one author has noted, allowing mini-
mally-damaging attacks serves a function similar to that of medical 
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immunization; exposure to a similar form of attack builds defenses.214
The most relevant benefit is that this form of self-governance will op-
erate in a transjurisdictional manner in ways that legal solutions 
applied to the United States alone cannot.215
A.   Tort Solutions 
 Tort-based solutions attempt to limit the number of opportunities 
that malicious hackers have available to them by focusing on incen-
tivizing either software developers or end users to remove those op-
portunities. Because targeting either party alone does not fully ad-
dress the problems, an implementable solution would have to include 
tort liability for both classes.216 Two broad forms of liability may be 
applied, either a negligence scheme or a strict liability approach. The 
latter is an attempt to solve the negligence-based liability scheme’s 
difficulty in defining an appropriate standard of care for either party. 
 In a negligence regime applied to software developers, it is un-
clear what standard of care would be applied. As some level of error 
is assumed in software development,217 defining any error as negli-
gent sets an unreasonably high standard of care, which essentially 
morphs into a strict liability approach. Defining a fixed-error rate, 
such as X errors per Y lines of code, presents significant problems of 
both definition and proof. For example, one would need to define the 
relevant level of error, specify a code-sampling scheme, and make ex-
pert review of code a necessity for all litigation. A simpler approach 
would define certain classes of known errors as falling below the 
standard of care.218 This standard would need to adequately define 
both this class of errors as well as the manner in which new errors 
become sufficiently publicized to enter this class.219 Mechanisms for 
dividing responsibility with respect to software interoperability 
would need to be created and would need to emphasize vulnerability 
resolution and avoid litigation “blame games.” Even further, ques-
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tions regarding retroactive application remain—how soon will old 
software need to be patched?220
 Negligence applied to end users is similarly problematic. The least 
restrictive solution would require end users to maintain a minimum 
level of security, such as maintaining out-of-box settings or using 
firewall and antimalware software.221 Even the least restrictive and 
most manageable solution has many difficulties. Since malware is of-
ten meant to operate quietly, so as to not alert even conscientious us-
ers, a single lapse in security could provide a sufficient foothold.222
Family computers could be exposed by infrequent users, and even 
careful users may be duped by clever social engineering techniques. 
Proving unreasonable behavior may be a significant burden, particu-
larly considering the number of possible defendants in a botnet at-
tack. Further, since the use of a “zombie” could likely be isolated to a 
particular form of malware,223 software with multiple methods of in-
fecting computers, at least one of which would avoid the standard se-
curity protocols, could render end users entirely immune to liability. 
 Strict liability applied to both parties would leave more options for 
victims of attacks and resolve ambiguities in the standard of care, at 
the risk of overpenalizing both software developers and end users. 
The most reasonable of these approaches attempts to apportion lia-
bility based on the introduction of a software patch for a given vulne-
rability.224 Prior to the introduction of the patch, the software devel-
oper would be strictly liable for damages, and after the patch has 
been introduced, the contributory negligence of end users failing to 
apply the patch may alleviate some of that liability.225 One criticism 
of this theory is that it establishes incentives to rush untested 
patches to market, particularly in the case where a given malware 
developer has demonstrated a willingness to inflict as much harm as 
possible prior to the patch.226 Further questions remain about the 
transitional period between the release of the patch and an appropri-
ate time period for its application, as few users wait anxiously re-
freshing Web sites in search of software patches. 
 More importantly, these solutions do not address the full scope of 
the problem. First, there may be many judgment-proof defendants. 
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Software is not always written by developers with deep pockets—
some developers may already be defunct by the time the vulnerabili-
ty is discovered and exploited.227 Furthermore, the efforts in discov-
ery to prove the involvement and negligence of end users may not be 
justified by the damage done, particularly if many infected comput-
ers are used in an attack. Second, there are jurisdictional concerns 
both for foreign developers, particularly those not selling their soft-
ware in the United States, as well as foreign nationals whose com-
puters were used in an attack. Lastly, there are fundamental fair-
ness concerns given the prospect of potentially limitless liability. 
End-user liability seems draconian when one considers how little the 
average user knows about computer security. And while software de-
velopers are better positioned to detect errors, perfect information 
comes at a prohibitive cost, especially with regard to entire classes of 
errors that have not been discovered yet. This concern may be alle-
viated by risk-balancing mechanisms such as insurance; however, 
these forms of liability represent a massive paradigm shift in the 
market that would take a considerable amount of time to phase-in 
appropriately228 while still retaining legacy problems in terms of out-
dated and unsupported software for many years still to come. 
B.   Regulatory Solutions and Criticism 
 The other major category of cybercrime law reform recommends 
decriminalizing harmless or ethical hacking, frequently under a form 
of regulation such as a duty to report successful hacking incidents.229
This form of regulation shapes the preferences of would-be hackers, 
offering them alternatives with distinct benefits and costs.230 By de-
criminalizing ethical hacking, the disincentives based on criminal 
and tort liability under the CFAA or related statutes would disap-
pear, which should make the activity more desirable. This could in-
fluence two classes of potential ethical hackers—both those who are 
currently deterred from some amount of hacking activity because of 
this liability and those who would prefer ethical hacking but other-
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wise choose to engage in malicious hacking so that the benefits 
match the potential costs. 
 Decriminalization has benefits that extend beyond the ethical 
hackers’ revelations of vulnerabilities and insecure configurations. 
First, there would be social benefits relating to the demarginalization 
of ethical hackers; repaired relationships with law enforcement per-
sonnel and a reduced cultural gap with the public at large would 
produce cooperative benefits.231 Second, decriminalization would fo-
cus investigative resources on activities with greater social harm.232
Third, ethical hackers would have more opportunity to develop crea-
tive technical insights and apply them for social benefit. 
 Critics reply that decriminalization undermines the signaling as-
pect of the criminal law and causes significant social harm simply by 
allowing unauthorized access to a private computer or network. This 
harm manifests in two ways—both the social weight placed on priva-
cy and the chilling effects that may ensue from that loss of privacy.233
Critics also charge that decriminalization signals acceptance of hack-
ing as an activity and allows hackers to decide independently wheth-
er or not to report an incident.234 Further, there are different toler-
ance levels between targets; some computer systems are unable to 
perform vital functions while undergoing attacks and others may dif-
ferentially value privacy.235 Lastly, there are monitoring and  
reporting costs associated with hacking attempts, which may  
differentially affect large businesses from small businesses or indi-
vidual users.236
C.   Encouraging Hacking Contests: An Effective Compromise? 
 To address these concerns, one author has suggested a policy of 
encouraging and expanding private hacking contests.237 Under this 
model, a series of challenges offered by discrete organizations such as 
businesses or perhaps governmental departments could challenge 
hackers to compromise the system.238 Rewards may be offered by the 
sponsoring entity, including monetary or reputational awards.239
Regular and frequent contests would be required to consistently 
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channel the creative energies of the community, both toward identi-
fying problems under a monitored environment and away from cri-
minally sanctioned hacking.240 Proprietary information must be pro-
tected and boundaries clearly defined so that hackers are encouraged 
to stay within a manageable framework.241 Government intervention 
may be necessary to jump start this proposed solution, both in terms 
of monetary incentives like tax breaks to participating firms and the 
creation of sentence enhancements for illegal hacking against firms 
that sponsor contests.242
 This solution encourages the positive aspects of decriminalization 
while avoiding the criticisms against it. By carefully structuring the 
contest protocol and having voluntary participation on the part of 
firms, there are no costs due to a loss of privacy. Participating firms 
are able to quickly implement the lessons learned from successful 
penetrations, and new methods of attack may be reported for a 
broader social benefit.243 With benign hacking channeled into a more 
narrow set of activities, law enforcement may focus on more harmful 
incidents.244 Perhaps most importantly, the punitive structure of the 
criminal law is untouched while actively engaging the creativity  
of the hacking community and building relationships with  
that community.245
 Because it operates under the significant constraint of attempting 
to avoid each of the criticisms against the regulatory model, the con-
test proposal makes only modest gains against the larger problem. 
Given sufficient contests and opportunities present at all times, it 
would seem to effectively engage the creative energies of the commu-
nity. To the extent that look-and-see hacking is noise that obscures 
more malicious exploitation, the contest model could eliminate some 
of the more benign crime by channeling it away from the targets of 
malicious hackers. A greater focus on quasi-public hacking contests 
might also reveal software vulnerabilities at an increased rate if it ei-
ther encourages more creative hacking in general or places vulnera-
bilities within a context where they would be reported or observed 
more readily. 
 However, by attempting to limit the playing field to a discrete set 
of contest servers, the immunization effects are more localized than 
they need to be. The weakest link principle of security states that “[a] 
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security system is only as strong as its weakest link.”246 Regardless of 
how secure contest servers might be, aside from incidental benefits 
stemming from vulnerabilities that can be patched in other systems, 
the contests will not improve the security of a typical home user. As 
the even moderate success of technically-outdated script-kiddies in-
dicates, even when the patch is released, not all home users benefit 
from the patch.247 A fully patched and secure company network may 
still be susceptible to a denial-of-service attack from a host of inse-
cure home computers in a sufficiently large botnet. Nor does a con-
test model ensure that every system within the sponsoring organiza-
tion becomes appropriately more secure, either because the lessons 
learned from the contest were not effectively applied or because the 
differences in system configurations between the contest system and 
the insecure system were too significant.248
D.   A Broader Approach: Constrained Reporting 
 Perhaps the most significant problem in the contest method is 
that it overvalues the societal emphasis on privacy. Because of the 
low transaction costs of exploiting a particular weakness on a partic-
ular computer, potentially any computer connected to the Internet 
can be exploited. Once compromised in the proper way, a computer 
may be a weapon applied against another innocent victim. Depend-
ing upon the capabilities of the malware, any privacy that the users 
of a compromised computer think that they have is illusory; an earli-
er warning of a problem might even prevent greater exposure of pri-
vate material. Viewed in this light, the risk of unauthorized access by 
a malicious hacker, coupled with the serious harms that can flow 
from the access, is contrasted with the prospect of unauthorized but 
minimally harmful access by an ethical hacker. While arguments 
against the regulatory model appear to balance the loss of privacy 
with some incidental gains in security, they seem to understate the 
damage that can come from exploitation by a malicious hacker.249 A 
compromised computer is a prospective weapon against a third party. 
Even if the loss of privacy due to ethical hackers can be minimized, 
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the potential damage incurred by third parties should outweigh the 
idiosyncratic value of lost privacy.  
 Given the low transaction costs of attempting to exploit a security 
hole and the creativity evident in the malicious hacking community, 
systems that can be compromised by ethical hackers can also be 
compromised by malicious hackers. Rather than attempting to bal-
ance the odds of a potential exploit, considering the statistics on ex-
isting infected computers and given the large number of computers 
connected to the Internet, policy makers should assume that poten-
tial vulnerabilities will eventually be exploited by someone. The ques-
tion that remains is what will follow from the unauthorized access. 
 Here, criticism that contends that allowing access will permit 
hackers to “price” their activities may be overstated.250 The first 
group who might produce a negative benefit from decriminalization 
would be the class of hackers who would engage in malicious activity 
but are deterred from doing so by the intent-to-access standard and 
low damage threshold of the current CFAA. To be deterred, this 
group must believe that there is sufficient risk of detection to war-
rant avoiding the activity entirely. If that is the case, then under a 
decriminalized regime, these opportunistic hackers would need to re-
port their incidents when the risk of detection is high enough. Ob-
taining access might allow for a more informed judgment as to 
whether a particular computer is likely to register the intrusion or 
whether the action can be hidden by destroying evidence of the in-
trusion, for example. It is not clear whether there is a significant dis-
tinction between the two risks. Given the limited capabilities of most 
targets and the empirically low prosecution rates, it is difficult to see 
the currently-deterred malicious hackers as a significant group. The 
second group to produce a negative benefit is comprised of those who 
appear ethical at first but are unable to resist the temptation of 
available information that can be parleyed into another tangible ben-
efit. In this way, merely allowing the access that provides the temp-
tation does create a minor social harm, but the more practical and 
significant harm stems from actual abuse of the opportunity. 
 By contrast, a limited form of regulated decriminalization should 
not significantly affect the motivations of malicious hackers. If mali-
cious hackers discover to their chagrin that little value can be 
gleaned from a compromised system, the decision to leave without a 
report would be unchanged from today’s legal scheme, but a decision 
to report the intrusion offers the victim the opportunity to close the 
security hole. Committed ethical hackers would choose to report ra-
ther than price their activity as a matter of principle, so decriminali-
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zation only increases the number of incident reports from this class 
by allowing them to report without fear of prosecution. 
 To take advantage of the latter two groups of hackers, the CFAA 
should be amended to include a safe harbor for ethical hacking that 
is sufficiently more constrained than the mere reporting. These safe 
harbors should minimize disruptions to the signaling function of the 
criminal law in terms of defining an offense while attempting to 
compensate for the overly punitive development of the law. As the 
reporting system becomes more constrained, the safe harbor may ap-
pear less a form of decriminalization and more like a specific excep-
tion and a limited form of agency. At the same time, the greater the 
hassle in the reporting system, the more likely it is that it will deter 
the targeted populations of ethical hackers. 
 While some compromise must clearly be struck, one of the first 
difficult issues will be the manner of reporting penetration attempts. 
Reporting attempts prior to actual intrusions would appear to elimi-
nate the ability of a would-be hacker to price his or her intrusion. 
However, given the massive volumes of data involved in automated 
port scans, it may not be technologically feasible to centralize this 
data collection from an indeterminate number of users using mul-
tiple methods of attack against a large number of targets. To reem-
phasize the limits of the safe harbor, a form of sentence enhancement 
could be applied to filing a false penetration report certifying that no 
proprietary or personal information was obtained. In establishing 
that the safe harbor itself is a tool for prosecution if abused, it rein-
forces the limited nature of the exception. Essentially, the limitations 
would attempt to reestablish, in protocol, the sort of informal ethics 
that guided earlier hackers.  
 A few fundamental principles should guide the development of 
these safe harbors. First, the primary goal of developing safe harbors 
should be to provide a workable method that allows any technically 
competent ethical hacker to contribute. Next, considering the poten-
tial dangers of market perception on full reporting, incident reports 
should not be freely accessible outside of existing legal requirements 
to report security breaches.251 Data could be collated anonymously so 
that patterns could be assessed without tying them to individual 
firms. One benefit of a reporting regime may be to increase the avail-
able information for security researchers. Third, protocols will need 
to be developed to minimize the exposure of personal or proprietary 
information while preventing cyber vigilante behavior. It is imagina-
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ble that an individual with significant access to a system could ac-
tually close the security hole that allowed the entry, but authorizing 
such behavior would expose targets to undue risk of unintentional 
damage. Fourth, the reporting system should be structured in such a 
way as to allow hackers the opportunity to compete and develop the 
equivalent of a portfolio based on pseudonymity through a “handle.” 
With a generalized reporting system, perhaps distinguishing the me-
thod of intrusion or target size in such a way as to maintain target 
confidentiality, individual hackers may be able to build a reputation 
within the hacking subculture and for potential employment. 
 At this stage, the different laws and sheer variety of attack vec-
tors require different approaches. Different constraints would need to 
be applied to the author of a benign worm, replication limitations 
and payload for example, than would need to be applied to an author 
of a Web page that mimics a phishing site who might be required to 
not provide any method to actually submit information from the Web 
form. Without more technical acumen, it is difficult to imagine how 
to establish the functionality of a keylogger on a target system with-
out the risk of obtaining sensitive information. For those who are 
more technically inclined, public dialog in drafting the nature of 
these safe harbors would cover technical issues and give administra-
tors an indication of how to strike an appropriate balance between 
constraints and ease of use. 
E.   Anticipated Criticism 
 A heavily-circumscribed decriminalization regime clearly creates 
its own set of problems, not the least of which is theoretical. The so-
lution is premised on empirical observations—the massive foothold of 
botnets on cyberspace and the emerging threat demand action. Mere 
sentence enhancements coupled with only marginal increases in ar-
rests and prosecutions are clearly not the answer; the current legal 
regime already has only the barest of connections to moral culpabili-
ty. Ascribing liability to either software developers or individual 
computer owners (or both) has significant problems in both logistics 
and culpability. At the same time, both of these classes need to be 
motivated to contribute to the community-wide effort. The most ap-
parent method is increasing awareness, both general and specific, of 
both technical and human vulnerabilities. 
 The theoretical basis for this solution is a social determination 
that the risk of a compromised computer is significant enough that 
we should essentially treat vulnerable systems as already compro-
mised. Given the low transaction costs of an automated attack, this 
may not be unreasonable. Compromised systems may have both lost 
their privacy (at least insofar as an ethical hacker can compromise 
2009]            TECHNOLOGICAL NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH 581 
the privacy, so could a malicious hacker) and become weapons 
against another innocent victim. Similarly, incident-response costs 
for system administrators are socially treated as costs that would 
have been spent anyway from the presumed penetration of a mali-
cious hacker. There seems to be little left to protect by deterring 
those ethical hackers who would take steps to inform the system’s 
owner or a central authority. So while attempting to mitigate—if not 
actually moot a vulnerable computer owner’s privacy interests—the 
social threat to secondary victims of a successful penetration becomes 
the dominant interest. If the newly emboldened ethical hackers are 
further constrained by protocols that minimize the potential for 
harm, then there may be a sufficient basis to justify limited decrimi-
nalization. Instead of allowing hackers to act in the nebulous area of 
“gray hat” hacking, the law may actually provide a clearer signal as 
to allowed or prohibited behavior.  
 This social determination would be a legal fiction that stands on 
weak theoretical grounds when applied to some individual cases. 
There is no way to know that any individual target of this new class 
of ethical hacker would have been infected by a malicious hacker. For 
example, consider a moderately conscientious user who has left on 
vacation and comes home to find a new vulnerability already 
patched. With mail to check and bills to pay, the user waits some 
time before applying the patch, and because the vulnerability is so 
new, few automated tools exist so no malicious hackers attempt to 
exploit it in the interim. Allowing an ethical hacker to access the sys-
tem in the meantime creates the capacity for social harm where it 
would not have existed otherwise. Only the class of initially ethical 
hackers who are unable to resist the temptation of the forbidden data 
establishes a harm unique to this proposal. The significance of that 
harm depends upon both the size of the class and the logistical im-
plementation of the safe harbor.
 Clearly, criticism of this sort will be able to establish many indi-
vidual cases of harm that could be created by the solution. At the 
same time, the theoretical consistency of a clear signal, specifically 
that no unauthorized access is allowed, is lost. However, this theoret-
ical consistency has come at the expense of punishing conduct dis-
proportionately to moral culpability, so a new theoretical inconsis-
tency that better tracks empirical trends may not be altogether un-
warranted. Other attempts to maintain the theoretical consistency 
do not make sufficient inroads into the breadth of the problem. Ulti-
mately, failing to address the problem leaves users’ privacy at such a 
risk that it begs the question of what is left to protect. 
 Perhaps the greater difficulties stem from the logistical imple-
mentation of a safe harbor. For instance, what technical solutions, 
such as a central database to “register” hacking attempts, are re-
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quired, and how will these systems be effectively administered? 
What happens in the instance where, like the Morris worm, a well-
intentioned programmer252 makes a mistake and fails to follow speci-
fied protocols? Will the implementation be capable of distinguishing 
post hoc attempts to immunize unsuccessful or unprofitable hacking 
from proper prehack reporting? And perhaps most importantly, can 
system administrators and other network security experts cope with 
the increased traffic—all of which must be presumed malicious at  
the outset? 
V.   CONCLUSION
 The risks presented by an insecure cyberspace have yet to be fully 
realized, and perhaps the lack of a “digital Pearl Harbor” has created 
a sense of complacency. While losses due to online fraud range in the 
tens of billions of dollars, very few incidents have created the capaci-
ty for serious danger to public welfare that could sufficiently moti-
vate lawmakers.253 Isolated incidents have given glimpses of the po-
tential effects of a truly malicious and well-coordinated attack, and it 
seems folly to assume that any malfeasants remain who have not 
taken notice. For now, reliance rests upon the traditional deterrents 
of both criminal and civil law, but the risks involved may eventually 
justify wider intervention. Given the alarming trend toward even 
broader criminalization demonstrated by recent European legisla-
tion, the prospect of Internet self-governance appears to be dimming. 
 This Comment has assumed without discussion that the present 
self-governance model of cyberspace is worth preserving. Some para-
digms for cyberspace governance or emergent technologies may ad-
dress the problems of insecurity in ways that would obviate the pro-
posed solution. These would necessarily entail greater levels of moni-
toring and perhaps even control of actual traffic. The social and polit-
ical ramifications of such a paradigm shift are clearly beyond the 
scope of this Comment, but there are a number of self-evident con-
cerns with regard to privacy and freedom of expression. For example, 
heuristics that effectively catalog and identify Web traffic, thereby 
detecting either denial-of-service attacks in progress or the auto-
mated searching of a worm, might drive the bulk of technically infe-
                                                                                                                    
 252. This should not be read as any assertion of the true intentions of Mr. Morris. 
However, such stunts have the potential to align with the early ethical hacking ethos, and 
the errant miscalculation or “bug” is a legitimate concern even for the demonstrably well-
intentioned. 
 253. However, recent reports of infrastructure vulnerability have the potential to raise 
such awareness. See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima & R. Jeffrey Smith, Electric Utilities May Be 
Vulnerable to Cyberattack, WASH. POST., Apr. 9, 2009, at A04, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/08/AR2009040803904.html; 
Bret Stephens, Opinion, Hiroshima, 2.0, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2009, at A13, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123966785804815355.html. 
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rior cybercriminals out of the market. It is unclear what level of mon-
itoring would be necessary to effectively implement such architectur-
al control. Even with these technologies, there may always be a cat-
and-mouse game as malicious traffic attempts to impersonate legiti-
mate traffic.  
 In the interim, enlisting the assistance of talented individuals 
who are disproportionately exposed to risk may subtly influence the 
community in ways that other legal solutions cannot. Collectively, 
these “white hats” form a sort of neighborhood watch in cyberspace 
and are an essential element of self-governance in response to crimi-
nally deviant behavior. While many act under the constraints im-
posed by the law and others likely flirt with the dangerously low 
thresholds set by the current law, these volunteers act under unac-
ceptably low thresholds for both criminal and civil liability. In addi-
tion to chilling reasonable self-governance, the overbroad signals of 
current law disconnect some members of the hacking community 
from the larger society that they might act to protect, branding them 
disproportionately to actual culpability. By limiting the tools availa-
ble for self-governance, and placing faith in marginally effective tra-
ditional deterrence and reactive countermeasures, governments may 
be inadvertently allowing the situation to become so untenable that 
it will eventually justify a more comprehensive form of centralized 
cyberspace governance.254
 In the absence of intrusive oversight, cyberspace security will re-
quire a community effort and investments from a larger population of 
actors working together. Establishing more methods for those with 
the talent and desire to help to do so legitimately would be an impor-
tant first step in reestablishing the trust necessary to drive this 
community effort. It may indeed take a village to keep cyberspace safe. 
                                                                                                                    
 254. ZITTRAIN, supra note 16, at 4 (“If security problems worsen and fear spreads, 
rank-and-file users will not be far behind in preferring some form of lockdown—and regu-
lators will speed the process along. In turn, that lockdown opens the door to new forms of 
regulatory surveillance and control.”). 
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